Recent Responses
Is there any credence to the idea that acting morally works in evolutionary terms, i.e., that it helps preserve the unity and survival of a co-dependent group? If this is the case, surely talk of absolute morality derived from religious scriptures is worthless, and our morality is just a refined survival technique. Thanks for a great site!
Allen Stairs
May 20, 2008
(changed May 20, 2008)
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It may well be that there's an evolutionary story to be told about how we come to adopt moral codes and so on. But your question, as I'm reading it, is whether this undermines the objectivity of morality -- leads to the conclusion that our moral views are neither correct nor incorrect, or something... Read more
I studied philosophy in university and I recall that one of my tutors for symbolic logic was trying to walk me through a problem by saying that if you have a large enough set of premises, two of them will inevitably contradict one another. I've always had trouble understanding (and consequently, accepting) this proposition because: if one conceives of reality as a set of claims (e.g., I am right-handed, electron X is in position Y, 2 + 2 = 4, etc.) there are an infinite number of "premises" to the "argument" that is reality and consequently reality is self-contradictory. Am I missing something here? Can you explain which of us is right about this and in which sense? I should mention that I don't necessarily have a problem with reality being self-contradictory, but that really throws symbolic logic out the window (and doesn't throw it out the window at the same time)! Thanks to all respondents for their time. -JAK
Alan Soble
May 23, 2008
(changed May 23, 2008)
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Maybe the tutor was thinking something like this (I seem to recall it from Popper). Let's consider only atomic (simple) contingent propositions (A, B, C, ... , Z) that are logically independent of each other. The probability that an atomic contingent proposition is true is less than 1 and greater tha... Read more
I studied philosophy in university and I recall that one of my tutors for symbolic logic was trying to walk me through a problem by saying that if you have a large enough set of premises, two of them will inevitably contradict one another. I've always had trouble understanding (and consequently, accepting) this proposition because: if one conceives of reality as a set of claims (e.g., I am right-handed, electron X is in position Y, 2 + 2 = 4, etc.) there are an infinite number of "premises" to the "argument" that is reality and consequently reality is self-contradictory. Am I missing something here? Can you explain which of us is right about this and in which sense? I should mention that I don't necessarily have a problem with reality being self-contradictory, but that really throws symbolic logic out the window (and doesn't throw it out the window at the same time)! Thanks to all respondents for their time. -JAK
Alan Soble
May 23, 2008
(changed May 23, 2008)
Permalink
Maybe the tutor was thinking something like this (I seem to recall it from Popper). Let's consider only atomic (simple) contingent propositions (A, B, C, ... , Z) that are logically independent of each other. The probability that an atomic contingent proposition is true is less than 1 and greater tha... Read more
One can create axioms that make statements like "all bachelors are married" true. What is wrong with calling these truths analytic as a shorthand for the type of truth it is based on the type of axiom it is derived from, much in the way we use the adjectives arithmetic, set-theoretic, or logical to denote those types of formal truths? I feel like one could decide whether a truth is analytic by seeing which (kinds of) axioms need to involved in making it true.
Alexander George
May 16, 2008
(changed May 16, 2008)
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There is nothing stopping you from defining an analytic theorem of a formal system to be one whose derivation requires appeal to at least one member of a designated subset of axioms. But on what basis are you deciding to single out that particular subset of axioms? If you say you're being guid... Read more
Many claims about what is possible or logical seem to rest on what is conceivable to the human mind. But what reason do we have to believe that there's any link between the way our minds work and the way things actually are?
Mitch Green
May 16, 2008
(changed May 16, 2008)
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Thank you for your question. For a long while in the history of philosophy it was thought that what was conceivable was a good indication of what was possible. Descartes is a good example of this way of thinking, though he was careful to require that not any old conceiving of a thing showed it to b... Read more
I was taught that philosophers should not try to abolish ordinary notions like "existence" or "truth," but only to explore them. But I have also heard that time may not be necessary for fundamental physics. In general it seems possible for science to drop an ordinary type of notion by demonstrating a theory (or theories) without it. Can philosophy also do away with an ordinary notion? Should it try to?
Allen Stairs
May 16, 2008
(changed May 16, 2008)
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"Shoulds" in philosophy are a tough sell. And in particular, the idea that philosophers "should not" try to overturn ordinary notions is one that's regularly challenged by philosophers. For example: many philosophers have argued that there is no such thing as a "self." Some philosophers have argued... Read more
Can poetry be used to express deeply philosophical ideas?
Jasper Reid
May 15, 2008
(changed May 15, 2008)
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Poetry can certainly be used to express profound ideas and attitudes concerning (for want of a better expression) 'the human condition'. These ideas can affect the reader's soul in a powerful way, helped along by the captivating power of the medium itself. And examples of poetry that might be regarde... Read more
People say that to be a good person you should help others without expecting anything in return, because then you're just being selfish. But anytime we help someone, we all get a feeling of self gratification. Helping others makes us feel good inside. Isn't that in itself being selfish? Can it be that the real reason we help others is because it gives us something back, that being, a good feeling inside? In which case, wouldn't it be fair to say that we're all selfish, and will only help others to help ourselves?
David Brink
May 15, 2008
(changed May 15, 2008)
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The fact that we take pleasure in performing good acts and even perhaps expect to take pleasure in good acts doesn't mean that we perform them in order to produce this pleasure for ourselves. To assume that we must be acting selfishly in such cases would be to confuse the consequences we intend and... Read more
Recently in politics the word 'elitist' has been used in bad connotations; as if it is bad to be elite. Why shouldn't our leaders be elitists?
Douglas Burnham
May 15, 2008
(changed May 15, 2008)
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An interesting question. The word comesfrom 'elite', obviously, and ultimately from Latin by way of French;originally it meant the 'chosen' or 'elected'. So, in a democracy(and for the purposes of this answer I'll assume that's the positionwe are concerned with) our leaders are indeed the 'elite'... Read more
To whom it may concern; I thank you in advance for your assistance. I had a discussion with some of my colleagues regarding a problem that I identified. Basically, I got two different and contradictory results of the same problem (i.e., a paradox) using different but equally valid methodologies and rationales in our area of research. I propose to resolve this paradox by making some adjustments to the methodologies in order to make them consistent. As you know, when paradoxes are found, solutions have to be advanced in order to resolve the inconsistencies, and this in turn strengthens the whole methodology. The problem is that I identified the aforementioned paradox by means of a simulated, laboratory-type of study, in which ideal conditions are assumed and simulated. Since my area of research is business studies, my colleagues allege that the “paradox” I found is not valid, because it is not based on data from real firms. They added that for the paradox to be valid, real data would have to be used. I argue that on the contrary, the problems raised by the paradoxical situation I found are very likely to “get worse”, so to speak, in studies with real firms, since the data and conditions under which those studies are run are going to be far from the ideal situation I simulated. In short, my argument is that “if it is bad under ideal situations and conditions (i.e., lab study), it can only get worse when less than ideal situations and conditions are expected (i.e., studies with real firms), thus the paradox I found is even more relevant in studies with real data”. The last sentence in the above paragraph is based on my own logic and intuition. It makes so much sense to me, that I am surprised that my colleagues do not see it that way. Therefore, I would like to know if there is any “theorem” or “law” or “argument” in the philosophy and/or logics fields that would back up my rationale. Since my area of research is an empirical field mainly, I thought that maybe there is a logical or philosophical argument, theorem or law that would assert something along the lines of “if the results obtained by a lab study (i.e., ideal conditions) are inconsistent, an empirical study with real firms (i.e., less than ideal conditions) are expected to be also inconsistent”. I apologize for perhaps not using the appropriate terminology and concepts, and also for the lengthy question. I hope you can help me with my query. Regards.
Marc Lange
May 15, 2008
(changed May 15, 2008)
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I don't think that there is or could be a general principle that says that a paradox arising from idealizations will inevitably carry over (much less become worse) when the idealizations are relaxed. In some cases, the paradox will disappear when the idealizations are removed. In other cases, the para... Read more