Recent Responses
Are mathematical statements existential statements? I ask because we're taught that set theory is, in a sense, foundational to all mathematics, and most of the propositions considered in set theory essentially assert the existence of particular sets.
Peter Smith
May 11, 2008
(changed May 11, 2008)
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I'd separate the question whether mathematical statements are (often) existential from the question of the status of set theory. (Sure, we can construct faithful proxies inside set theory for most of the structures that mathematicians are interested in. But it is a moot question whether this makes se... Read more
One can create axioms that make statements like "all bachelors are married" true. What is wrong with calling these truths analytic as a shorthand for the type of truth it is based on the type of axiom it is derived from, much in the way we use the adjectives arithmetic, set-theoretic, or logical to denote those types of formal truths? I feel like one could decide whether a truth is analytic by seeing which (kinds of) axioms need to involved in making it true.
Alexander George
May 16, 2008
(changed May 16, 2008)
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There is nothing stopping you from defining an analytic theorem of a formal system to be one whose derivation requires appeal to at least one member of a designated subset of axioms. But on what basis are you deciding to single out that particular subset of axioms? If you say you're being guid... Read more
Two questions. It seems that no one has figured out good standards for acceptance or rejection of philosophical arguments. In science, observation is king. If evidence contradicts a theory under careful conditions, the theory is false. In math, we justify things formally; we cannot expect more certainty. So would you agree that philosophy, as a field that aims at knowledge and not something else like evoking emotions, suffers from a lack of standards? And since at the moment I suspect it does, I want to ask also, why do philosophers act so certain? To them their arguments are true or correct (or whatever) without empirical evidence or rigorous proof. They should be the most uncertain people of all, even more so than scientists. And they are pretty darn humble. (A better way to ask this might be, aren't proof and evidence the two best ways to knowledge? If so, shouldn't philosophers be much more uncertain than they appear (to me)? I now realize it's dependent on how I see things, so I only hope you can sympathize.)
Peter Smith
May 10, 2008
(changed May 10, 2008)
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Just a footnote to Marc Lange's response (which seems spot on to me). It is worth adding that in serious analytical philosophy there is actually a good deal more agreement on arguments than there might appear to be at first sight, and there is a good deal of pretty secure knowledge.
For what often e... Read more
Why should an average, run of the mill, person care about philosophy? The vast majority of people I know don't give a damn whether a given action is "a priori" or "a posteriori," for example. The closest they come to philosophy are stupid questions that any beginning philosophy major could solve, like "Can God make a rock so heavy He can't lift it?" And these are merely bait to get an emotional reaction out of me, not a true question about philosophy!
Peter Smith
May 9, 2008
(changed May 9, 2008)
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Well, why should an "average" person (whoever she is) care about the history of Venetian convents in the sixteenth century, or about the genetics of mice, or about large cardinal axioms in set theory, or the geology of the Caucasus mountains, or Italian linguistics?
No special reason!
Why should it be... Read more
If philosophy does not yield empirical predictions like science or certain truths like math or logic, what does it do? I have heard of "clarification of concepts" but science and math do that, too.
Marc Lange
May 8, 2008
(changed May 8, 2008)
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Does there need to be a single, particular contribution that philosophical research makes and other disciplines fail ito make? Of course, science and math clarify concepts and contribute to making empirical predictions. Philosophical research does all of that, too, from time to time. I don't think ther... Read more
Two questions. It seems that no one has figured out good standards for acceptance or rejection of philosophical arguments. In science, observation is king. If evidence contradicts a theory under careful conditions, the theory is false. In math, we justify things formally; we cannot expect more certainty. So would you agree that philosophy, as a field that aims at knowledge and not something else like evoking emotions, suffers from a lack of standards? And since at the moment I suspect it does, I want to ask also, why do philosophers act so certain? To them their arguments are true or correct (or whatever) without empirical evidence or rigorous proof. They should be the most uncertain people of all, even more so than scientists. And they are pretty darn humble. (A better way to ask this might be, aren't proof and evidence the two best ways to knowledge? If so, shouldn't philosophers be much more uncertain than they appear (to me)? I now realize it's dependent on how I see things, so I only hope you can sympathize.)
Peter Smith
May 10, 2008
(changed May 10, 2008)
Permalink
Just a footnote to Marc Lange's response (which seems spot on to me). It is worth adding that in serious analytical philosophy there is actually a good deal more agreement on arguments than there might appear to be at first sight, and there is a good deal of pretty secure knowledge.
For what often e... Read more
Why is the continuation of the human atomic structure an insufficient explanation for continued personal identity of an individual? If subject "a" remains subject "a" on an atomic level surely that constitutes the continuation of that subject. Arguably the atoms change over time, but not all at once. If say one atom changes on Monday, and then next on Tuesday, the very fact that an atom from Monday remains on Tuesday (even if it was the new atom on Monday) allows for the continuation of that subject. This simplistic example shows how on a basic level something of the person remains prior to the present moment.
Cheryl Chen
May 6, 2008
(changed May 6, 2008)
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Here's another thought experiment that philosophers sometimes appeal to in this context. Suppose someone invents a teleportation machine (like in Star Trek). The machine scans your body, vaporizes it, and then recreates a molecule for molecule duplicate somewhere on Mars. Would you survive this proc... Read more
I have an intellectual appreciation for the answers on this site, but at an emotional level I can't help but feel like vast heaps of it are nothing more than BS. Why do I feel this way? Why is philosophy so confounding?
Peter Smith
May 5, 2008
(changed May 5, 2008)
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One thing that can happen is this. Someone asks an inchoate, perhaps rather muddled, question. A respondent -- operating in the approved housestyle of analytical philosophy -- disentangles the issues, and having separated out a crisply formulated question or two, responds briskly to them with clinical... Read more
Recently I've had trouble comprehending the idea of a divide between music and noise. I was wondering, are noise and music one and the same? To compose something with the intention that it be noise music seems paradoxical to me, since music and noise seem to be two opposite ends on the line of 'sound'. Yet there exists noise music and even freeform jazz, with completely random notes and seemingly no structure at all. Is this still music? It seems to me that music is a form of art, and art is expression - so there is no reason really why this kind of noise shouldn't be classed as music, since it is the artists intention that it is music, even if its just random noise being recorded. I'm having real trouble understanding whether this is an actual problem or not. It seems to me there shouldn't exist any kind of boundaries in music (and so no boundaries between music and noise?), yet I am reluctant (for some intuitive reason perhaps?) to acknowledge these noise projects as forms of music. Thanks for your time, any help would be greatly appreciated.
Douglas Burnham
May 5, 2008
(changed May 5, 2008)
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A similar question has already been asked. Have a look at:
http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/729
It seems to me that 'music' and 'noise' are being used in twodifferent senses here. First, an 'objective' sense, as types ofthings whose properties can be enumerated. Second, as values: 'I likethi... Read more
Given that I can't infer an 'ought' from an 'is', am I always to assume then that moral arguments which seem to make this move actually have an implicit moral assumption? For example: 1. If you did that, you'd be hurting your sister unnecessarily. 2. (unstated) unnecessarily hurting your sister is wrong. 3. (unstated) you shouldn't do what's wrong. So you shouldn't do it.
David Brink
May 1, 2008
(changed May 1, 2008)
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Bingo! That seems the right thing to say if we believe, as you and I do, that there is logical gap between is and ought statements.
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