Recent Responses
It is generally accepted that certain intervals in music sound "harmonious", i.e. 3rds, 4ths and 5ths. Why is this so? Why do these certain intervals constitute a pleasant sounding harmony, as opposed to jarring, dissonant intervals like 2nds and 7ths? I do not believe it is a matter of taste - most people, even those with no musical training will uniformly identify a harmony as harmonious (or in tune) or dissonant (or out of tune, I suppose). However, I am open to being disproved on this point.
Allen Stairs
October 6, 2007
(changed October 6, 2007)
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It's an intriguing phenomenon. And it turns out, so I gather, that it's not confined to humans. Various animals differ in their responses to what we label consonant and dissonant intervals. Why this should be isn't something that a philosopher, as such, is in a good position to say. It clearly... Read more
Concerning our moral obligations to other people, what is the distinction between killing and letting die? For example, if I'm at the beach and there's a child playing in the water, I think I can safely say that everyone would agree that it would be wrong for me to go in to the water and drown the child. But say I see the child drowning, and there's no one else around, and I could easily jump in and save him without risking my own life, would it be wrong for me to stand there and do nothing as he drowns? I'm not so sure what one's moral obligation is in this case. Personally, I would feel awful about letting the child drown and would certainly try to save him, but maybe not everyone would, and I'm hesitant so say they've done something wrong by doing nothing. In other words I don't know if I would support a law punishing such behavior.
Jyl Gentzler
October 13, 2007
(changed October 13, 2007)
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I would like to distinguish two questions: (1) In any given case, is the mere difference between killing and letting die morally significant? and (2) From the point of view of public policy, should we draw a distinction between killing and letting die?
I am convinced by the arguments that Ja... Read more
Can you be punished for planning a crime? Say your planned to do forgery and you called up friend who has the 'talent.' The friend say she wouldn't do it. Another person knew about you planning to forge and tells the school authorities. Does the school authority have the right to impose punishment on you for contemplating to do forgery? When you think evil things such as stealing does that already make you immoral? What do philosophers say about planning to do evil?
Allen Stairs
October 5, 2007
(changed October 5, 2007)
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Sometime you can be punished for planning a crime: if it's a case of criminal conspiracy. That's an agreement with at least one other person to commit a crime. Just what the standard of proof might be is a question that I'd have to leave to a lawyer, but conspiracy has long been illegal.
If a... Read more
Are Quine's arguments against the distinction between analytic and synthetic in "Two dogmas of empiricism" really convincing? I have read Grice and Strawson's "In defence of a dogma" and agree that there is consent enough about the situations where the distinction is applied to and about the results of those applications so that we can't say the distinction doesn't really exist. Am I wrong about it? What readings else should I do? André C.
Emma Borg
October 5, 2007
(changed October 5, 2007)
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The fact that the debate about the status of the analytic/synthetic divide is still raging shows that many people share your opinion that Quine's objections aren't really convincing, and given the fact that Quine brings a lot of baggage to the problem with him (in terms of his overall behaviouri... Read more
I remember reading some decades ago wile in college, that Plato proposed that humans were originally created as four armed, four legged beings, and that is why we always search for our other half. Is there some book or citation you can direct me to, to re-learn about this? I have been sarching on line and think it's in Timaeus but can't find anything for sure.
Allen Stairs
October 3, 2007
(changed October 3, 2007)
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It's in the Symposium, in a speech by Aristophanes. The speech is posted separately here.
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The "new" atheist thinkers such as Richard Dawkins tell us that we should dismiss religions and the belief in God, since they are based solely on faith and have no adequate objective evidence for them. If we would follow this line of thought into metaphysics and especially ontology then wouldn't it become also a question of faith. Since there's no objective scientific way to demonstrate any of the arguments about universals or the ultimate building blocks of reality. Is it right to bring this kind of reasoning over from one topic to another and if so does it invalidate something? And if ontology never claimed to be objective in the sense described why anybody even bothered to deal with it.
Jasper Reid
October 1, 2007
(changed October 1, 2007)
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We need to distinguish between a posteriori and a priori arguments. Empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology are predominantly supported by a posteriori evidence, grounded in experience. By contrast, the 'exact sciences' like mathematics are predominantly supported by a priori... Read more
The 'State of Nature' is often appealed to in order to make systematic the justification of the state and the extent of our political obligations to it. What option does the present day anarachist have if he refuses to accept the force of these arguments and genuinely wishes to live a stateless, obligation-free, apolitical existence ? Surely he didn't 'choose' to be born into a modern state and yet it seems that there is little he can do to live an alternative life. Is this a significant restriction of his freedom ?
Allen Stairs
September 30, 2007
(changed September 30, 2007)
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Here are some options: (i) pick a country where there's not much in the way of rule of law and go off and live there. Or (ii) do as the founders of Sealand did, and try to set up shop on an oil rig or some such offshore. (But you might want to pick your territory a little more cleverly... Read more
If a woman does not want to support a child, she can choose to have an abortion. Of course, the would-be father ultimately has no say in this decision (he cannot force or prevent an abortion). Presumably, the asymmetry here relates to the fact that pregnancy and childbirth burden the mother to an infinitely greater extent than the father. What I don't understand, though, is why fathers may be forced to support (monetarily) children which they didn't want. If a woman decides to have a child in spite of her partner's disagreement, shouldn't she also assume full responsibility for that child? It seems as though the man has no say at all here. If the man wants the child, the woman may nevertheless abort; if he doesn't want the child (but she does), he nevertheless must support it.
Jyl Gentzler
October 13, 2007
(changed October 13, 2007)
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When a human child is brought into existence, whose moral responsibility is it to see that this child’s very significant needs are met? In most human societies, this responsibility has been given to its parents. It was due to the parents’ actions that this child came into existence in the fi... Read more
This question pertains to philosophical education or philosophical pedagogy: Even though I do not hold any degrees in philosophy (I hold undergraduate and graduate degrees in political science), I believe that philosophy should constitute one of the foundations of higher education. It is impossible, I believe, to be truly educated without a sound background in philosophy and logic. To this end, I have always believed that with the wonderful emergence of new technologies it should be incumbent upon every capable institution of higher learning to seek to disseminate such core foundations. This can be done, with remarkable ease these days, through distance learning. However, with the exception of a very small number of philosophy departments associated with certain universities, most departments of philosophy look upon distance learning, seemingly, with great loathing. Furthermore, the thought of actually establishing distance degree programs in philosophy (whether at the undergraduate or graduate level) is considered absurd. How do I know this? Because I received my Masters degree in political science from Virginia Tech -- online. Immediately following this educational experience -- a truly wonderful educational experience -- I queried a large number of departments of philosophy, asking why there were no online courses or online programs. I was greeted with great disdain for even asking the question. (Exceptions to this include Oxford University's beginnings in online philosophy courses, as well as the University of Illinois (Springfield) who has sought to develop an undergraduate degree (available online) in philosophy. Harvard University also offers one philosophy course -- available online -- each semester through their Extension division. I had the great pleasure of completing this online course (in metaphysics) a short while ago.) With so many homes and workplaces connected to high-speed/broadband Internet, and with the combination of online and on-campus (periodic/brief) residencies, the further development of undergraduate or graduate programs in philosophy (online) is certainly a viable option. (Especially when one considers the fact that as it pertains to "adult education," it is often tremendously difficult for individuals who are presently established in one locale (most often in association with their occupation) to be able to pick up and move their entire family to the on-campus situation. This is absolutely true in my case.) My question is: why do departments of philosophy find even the suggestion of online learning so disagreeable? Is there no hope for the further development of online philosophy courses and degree programs? Thanks in advance for all responses!
Andrew N. Carpenter
December 11, 2007
(changed December 11, 2007)
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My sense is that distrust of online learning has faded signficantly overall, andthat suspicion about this type of education ("loathing" seems toostrong, at least in my experience) among philosophers has eased somewhat in recent years.
Thatsaid, I think you are right to suggest tha... Read more
Do you believe in the socratic method in the teaching of children?
Allen Stairs
September 28, 2007
(changed September 28, 2007)
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It partly depends on what the method is supposed to be. In reading some of the Socratic dialogues, one gets the strong impression that it was a technique for walking the person being questioned into a pre-determined and sometimes peculiar answer. (Do we really think that Meno's slave boy... Read more