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Let's say that a virus spread throughout the world and damaged the areas of the brain that are responsible for emotions. The entire population was affected and could no longer experience any emotional reactions, although their reason and intellectual ability was unimpaired. Would morality change if we no longer have any emotional reaction to cheaters, thiefs, inequity, or tragedy? Maybe it's difficult to answer such a hypothetical, but any opinions would be appreciated.
Alan Soble
January 1, 2007
(changed January 1, 2007)
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Emotion-less or emotion-free creatures/beings have been explored in science fiction, including Stanley Kubrick's "2001" and "Star Trek." See what Wikipedia says about the 1956 B&W movie, "Invasion of the Body Snatchers," at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_the_Body_Snatchers.... Read more
Many people would say that it’s nearly always wrong not to act, whilst someone suffers an unnecessary death that could have easily been prevented. For example, simply watching a child wander onto a busy road, and not acting so as not to loose ones place in a queue at the post office. It’s difficult to see how this could be morally permissible. Many people would also say that they don’t feel any moral obligation to donate their spare money to charity. For example, the money that’s required for me to have the internet access I need to ask this question, could be used to pay for life saving medication which could spare many children in Africa from a needless death. On the one hand we’re morally obliged to help when we can, on the other it’s morally permissible not to help even though we can. Is there any way to make these seemingly conflicting beliefs compatible? Should we sell up and give the proceeds to the needy? Or should we admit to ourselves that we’re not prepared to live up to our own moral ideals? Thanks. S.G.
Jyl Gentzler
December 19, 2006
(changed December 19, 2006)
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As you may know, the question that you raise has been raised in very similar terms by Peter Singer in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972). Singer himself presents the moral challenge not merely to Utilitarians like himself, but to all of us, who he beli... Read more
Quine's Paradox (“yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation” yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation) doesn't seem to me to be a paradox. Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems to me like it's asserting nothing but the fact that it's false. For something to be true OR false, there must be some other claim made. When I look at the statement, it seems to me that it's not talking about anything but itself -- like an indirect self-reference. It seems to me to have no content but its own claim that it yields to falsehood, and would therefore neither be true nor false. Have I made a mistake in my reasoning/logic?
Richard Heck
December 17, 2006
(changed December 17, 2006)
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No, I don't see any mistake---other than that you dismiss the problem simply on the ground that there is self-reference. Self-reference isn't always a problem. In fact, some times it's essential. Consider this phrase:
(*) yields a sentence when preceded by its own quotation
This is a perf... Read more
I’ve run into a problem in philosophy recently that I do not completely appreciate. Certain sets are said to be “too big” to be sets. In Lewis’ Modal Realism, the set of all possible worlds is said to be one such set. These are sets whose memberships is composed of infinite individuals of a robust cardinality. I (purportedly) understand that not all infinities are equal. But I don’t quite see why there can be a set of continuum many objects, but not a set of certain larger infinities. Am I misunderstanding what it is to have “too big” a set?
Richard Heck
December 17, 2006
(changed December 17, 2006)
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As Alex says, in Lewis's case, he's really pointing towards an idea familiar from the philosophy of set theory. Not all "collections" of objects can form sets: The assumption that they do leads to contradiction. (Of course, we need some logical assumptions to get that contradiction, and th... Read more
I have a question about getting an advanced degree in philosophy: I hold an undergraduate and master’s degree in political science. Instead of getting a doctorate in political science I would like to switch gears and move into the realms of philosophy. In short, the more I investigated the philosophical underpinnings of my research in political science, the more I had a hunger to study philosophy as my first academic objective. (Even my doctoral prospectus (which was originally outlined during my Masters program), I have been informed by various political and social science faculty members throughout the country, is one that fits more appropriately within the realms of philosophy.) After completing the Masters (Virginia Tech), I began inquiring with various departments of philosophy (US) and found that it was going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be accepted into a graduate program in philosophy as a result of my lack of background in philosophy at the undergraduate and graduate levels. (Thus far, I have only had 2 formal courses in philosophy during my undergraduate and graduate years.) More particularly, I was informed that unless I came into the application process with at least 12-14 semester credits in philosophy background, I would most probably be denied admission. My question: it seems that the realm of philosophy is one in which you must “start from the beginning.” Switching from another major to philosophy is very difficult, if not impossible (or so I have been informed). It is something that is looked upon as almost “forbidden” — why is this? I certainly realize that there must be an academic foundation laid for any particular discipline. But the antipathy that is being expressed — or at least seemingly — for anyone who hasn’t started out at the undergraduate level with a philosophical background is surprising. (And as a result of my present circumstances, I do not live close to any major college or university at which I might be able to take a few more courses in philosophy in order to prepare for the graduate application. And try finding philosophy courses taught online — they are almost nonexistent.) It truly seems that most departments of philosophy expect — nay, demand — an individual have an undergraduate background in philosophy. Therefore, it would seem that if I wanted to pursue any graduate program in philosophy I must start all over again, as it were, and go back to “an undergraduate beginning in philosophy.” And if I may say so, there seems to be quite an amount of antipathy — within the departments of philosophy — for anyone who is seeking to switch majors (from some other realm to philosophy). It’s like you’re committing a capital crime. (I’m exaggerating of course, but I must say that there has not been a lot of affable disposition on the other end of the phone or e-mail contact when I have inquired about the graduate program, having come from a political science background.) If anyone would like to comment on the experiences that I have encountered thus far, I would be thrilled to get anyone’s perspective. Thanks in advance! Kevin
Thomas Pogge
December 17, 2006
(changed December 17, 2006)
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If you are really mainly interested in "the philosophical underpinnings of research in political science," then one plausible solution is to apply to political science doctoral programs after all. Look for a program that has strength in political theory/philosophy and/or is located at a un... Read more
If I say, "the probability of landing heads in a coin toss is 50%," have I made a mathematical statement or a scientific one?
Alexander George
December 16, 2006
(changed December 16, 2006)
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For a relevant entry, see Question 264.
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I am browsing your site and I noticed that there do not seem to be any panelists who specialize in Continental Philosophy. What do the panelists here think about the seeming divide between Analytic and Continental specializations in the field? Why hasn't this been addressed in any of the responses, especially in terms of methodology and the relation of Philosophy to other discipines?
Alexander George
December 16, 2006
(changed December 16, 2006)
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This question has been addressed. Please search for "continental" or follow this link to a few entries that discuss the matter.
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I’ve run into a problem in philosophy recently that I do not completely appreciate. Certain sets are said to be “too big” to be sets. In Lewis’ Modal Realism, the set of all possible worlds is said to be one such set. These are sets whose memberships is composed of infinite individuals of a robust cardinality. I (purportedly) understand that not all infinities are equal. But I don’t quite see why there can be a set of continuum many objects, but not a set of certain larger infinities. Am I misunderstanding what it is to have “too big” a set?
Richard Heck
December 17, 2006
(changed December 17, 2006)
Permalink
As Alex says, in Lewis's case, he's really pointing towards an idea familiar from the philosophy of set theory. Not all "collections" of objects can form sets: The assumption that they do leads to contradiction. (Of course, we need some logical assumptions to get that contradiction, and th... Read more
Why is it so easy to define "island" and so difficult to define "dog"? Both terms refer to quite "natural" and well-known things. We can say that an island is an area of land surrounded by water, but we can't say, for instance, that a dog is an animal that barks, since a sick dog that can't bark is still a dog. It is also curious that we all know what a dog is without knowing the zoological definition of this species. Is there a name for this difference between the two words?
Peter Lipton
December 16, 2006
(changed December 16, 2006)
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I'm a little bit worried about Australia, but let's leave that continent to one side. Sometimes what makes something a particular kind of thing is a set of superficial properties, while in other cases the relevant properties are less obvious. Island is in the former group, dog is the in... Read more
Can you create a fictional object that knows more than you do? For example, suppose I imagine a man, Physicsman, and I imagine that Physicsman knows all the laws of physics. I conceive him to be someone who knows all of the laws of physics. But does he know all the laws of physics? I mean, I don't, and he's my creation. Plus, if I tried to describe, in explicit detail, Physicsman articulating the laws of physics, unless I got lucky (guessing or whatever), I'd end up making him say stuff that's false, I expect. Something related: can fictional objects know *anything*? Is, "Obi-Wan knew that Anakin Skywalker turned to the Dark Side," true? If it is, how?
Peter Lipton
December 16, 2006
(changed December 16, 2006)
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Part of the answer to your question is that fictional objects don't exist: in that sense you don't create them. What you create is a kind of specification, like 'a person who knows all the laws of physics'. The specification is real, but there is no real person who fits it. But this isn'... Read more