Thank you for your kind words about this site! Your question is very difficult. To pick up your last suggestion: if there is an all good Creator who sustains the cosmos, and this G-d commands that the hungry be fed, then there would be an obligation for those with surplus food to give to those in famine. Under these circumstances, taking food from those with surplus would involve compelling them to do (or let happen) what was their obligation. This line of reasoning will only take us so far, however, not only due to doubts about God's existence and commands (doubts I do not share, by the way, but there is doubt) but because nowhere in the Hebrew Bible, Christian new Testament or Qur'an is there what appears to be a divinely revealed precept that one may kill to get food. As for the suggestion that it may be "the best philosophers" who decide what is right, I am afraid there is some disagreement. Some philosophers argue for stringent distributive justice and egalitarianism: there should be (as much...

Excellent question(s)! To begin, it may be mis-leading to think of the "will" as an entity, whether substantial or framented. It is perhaps more plausable to think of the "will" as an abstract way of referring to a person's intentional powers, so that to say that a person has free will or any kind of will, is to refer to a person having the power to act and, in the case of free will, the power to act in more than one way (to do an act or not do an act). There is a massive literature addressing your important questions going back to Socrates. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were suspicious of claims that people can do that which they know (or strongly believe) are wrong. (There is some controversy over interpreting Aristotle on this, but I suggest he stood with his teacher, Plato, on this.) Two promising approaches to this problem (which is sometimes called the problem of weakness of will or Akrasia, Greek for "lack of self-control") involve distinguishing levels of desires. Harry Frankfurt (Princeton...

Minor reservation about Professor Smith's observations: Peter may be absolutely right, though I suggest that amidst all the cheerfully multicolored possibilities, I think that there are some clear cut goods and ills or, to use your terms, black and white issues. Perhaps this is similar to many other areas of life in which we (rightfully) expect decency (no improper coercion or harmful manipulation, deception, and so on). But because of the important role of sexuality in intimacy when it is possible to bring others (and oneself) joy or profound harm, I suggest that sexual relations may come with a higher degree of respect and consideration than we expect under other circumstances. The point is difficult to state with clarity or force, but I wager that while many of us can live with a colleague who is occasionally manipulative and misleading about his true aims and not fully trust worthy, but this becomes a great deal more serious if this involves one's lover.

Good question! If one could not imagine oneself slaughtering an animal for food under any circumstances, then perhaps one should reflect on whether one's reluctance stems from a realization (deep down) that there is something morally disquieting or even wrong about killing animals for food. Still, the reason for the reluctance might rest on non-moral grounds (due to a childhood accident, one cannot stand the site of blood) and reflect a deep personal preference (perhaps one cannot imagine ever being a plumber or sanitation worker, but one still believes that the vocation of being a plumber or sanitation worker are good and vital for society). Flipping the question around, though, it might be noted that even if one can conceive of oneself slaughtering animals for food, and doing so happily, that alone would not be a reason to think that such slaughtering is good or morally permissible.

Great question! I have been reading and contributing to this site since last May and believe that there is very little in the way of philosophers claiming absolute I-could-not-possibly-be-wrong certainty. I believe this is why there is so little use of the word "prove" or "refute" in our discipline --unless the topic is logic. For example, I adopt a version of natural law theory of ethics as opposed to (for example) utilitarianism, but I would not claim to be able to prove the truth of natural law theory or refute utilitarianism. Moreover, except perhaps in technical matters of scholarship, I wager that very few (if any) of us would ever want readers to rely on our replies unless readers themselves considered the reasons offered good ones. Of course, I could be wrong.....

Dear Juan J., Thank you for your question! Philosophical reflection on philosophy is sometimes called meta-philosophy. There was a journal of that name that included philosophical reflection on such topics as the progress of philosophy and the challenges of arguing across philosophical frameworks. And some philosophers have famously set forth a whole system of inquiry and conclusions that address what you refer to as the form of problems and solutions, whether these concern the natural world or values or what today may be called theology, and so on. Aristotle was the first to do this with great systematic care. One can find deep progress on such matters in the work of Plato, but I suggest it was Aristotle who was able to be more systematic and comprehensive. Aquinas and Kant are also towering figures who articulated detailed, systematic accounts of philosopophical methodology as well as contributing to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and more. But as a philosophy enthusiast and future...

Excellent question! I wonder whether such disagreement entails that we lack a common, general vision for humanity's future. In your opening example of wide divergence, both parties probably agree on a huge number of points. Probably both groups believe in the importance of justice and compassion, the good of friendship and courage, the importance of intellectual integrity, the greatness of loving others, and so on. And probably both groups, at their best, are not driven by fear, but by what they passionately value. I imagine that those who see an ultimate purposive direction of the cosmos or value in it, are driven by an overwhelming sense that the goodness of the cosmos is too good (as it were) to have come into being by chance. And I imagine that the second group is probably humanist in orientation and share the belief that there is great goodness and value in human autonomy and creativity. In brief, I suspect that when one looks at the wide scope of values each group shares, one can see some...

Some philosophers have indeed wondered about the basis for family and romantic relations --from Plato to Abelard and Heloise to Bertrand Russell. I wonder, however, whether your worries about a foundation for a romantic, committed relationship wouldn't apply to any number of different relationships such as a non-romantic friendship or even non-committed romantic relationships (whom should I seek romance with tonight?), and the like. In any event, I wonder about the extent to which love is really under one's control. Isn't the situation often as follows: you meet someone whom (for whatever reason: beauty, wit, interests, history, philosophy, theology, athletic ability) you find attractive. You come to know and appreciate her as a good person and (idealy) vice versa, and this naturally leads to a desire for union (what is sometimes called unitive love). Isn't it more common for matters of justification to arise when one considers why one should not continue toward commitment? In other words, isn't the...

What an unusual and interesting question! Before replying directly, I wonder about your use of "only." Metaphors can be true or false, and are not necessarily less precise than literal or non-metaphorical terms. With that caveat, various promising philosophical conclusions do seem to involve metaphors. So, consider John Rawls' account of justice in terms of what rational, self-interested people would decide behind a veil of ignorance. I suppose one might claim this is a literal, non-metaphor, but Rawls is invoking a non-lieral usage of veil. Perhaps a more promising example (but not without controversy) would be philosophical arguments concerning God. Either pro-theisitic or atheistic arguments may well be seen as arguments which use the term "God" as a descriptive, metaphorical noun. There is a massive literature on the extent to which "God" should be seen as a literal or analogical or metaphorical term. Other examples of when metaphors seem very much to be in play: Hume's bundle theory of the...

What a great question! Post world war two, the movement of positivism tried to shut down all questions that could not be resolved with empirical verification. This movement would have shelved questions about justice (positivists took a non-cognitive approach to ethics and assumed moral judgments were mere expressions of emotions that are neither true nor false) and questions about beauty and such. But the movement ran into serious problems in the late 1960s, early 1970s, self-destructing in some cases (as when positivists claimed that only empirically verifiable statements are meaningufl, even though their claim about meaning could not itself be empirically verified). Plus the questions about love, justice, art, and so on seem irrepressable. Two things you might consider: First, I suggest that some substantial terrain is of profound importance even if we lack the common tools to reach a consensus. Questions about the nature of justice and love seem to fit that category and I believe that even...