I am about to start college and plan to do either an English honours course or a philosophy honours course for my graduation. But my parents are not quite supportive of this as they think that I am working myself into a dead end and these courses won't get me a job and are completely pointless. I am unwilling to do something more "career-oriented" as my interest lies in the aforementioned subjects. Am I being impractical by doing so as I don't have any long term goals? Will I repent my choice later?

As Question 2110 makes clear, the value of studying philosophy extends far beyond "career-oriented" preparation. Iwould also emphasize, however, that studying philosophy constitutes extremely strong preparation for many careers because itprovides you with superb opportunities for skill development, includinganalytical and creative thinking skills, analytical and creative oral and written communication skills, and, more generally, skills related to self-directed learning. Theseare extremely valuable skills in business and in other professions, and, since you also enjoy studying philosophy for its own sake, it strikes methat you have a lot to gain by working in this field. To be sure,every college course and each subject of study claims to contribute tocritical thinking and communication skills, and to some extent this istrue. Perhaps, therefore, it is mainly my own parochialism that leadsme to assert the following, although I do not think so: Workingintensively in philosophy is a...

I find it hard to read Derrida. Is one supposed to grapple with every word, in the same way that one would do with maths, or to just surf along the text, going 'I can sort-of-understand' in the same way one would read some poems (I am sure I am offending some poets here, but just want to illustrate my point).

One reading strategy that was taught to me when I first began studying philosophy as an undergraduate, and which has served me well since, is to read slowly enough that you can paraphrase the key point of each paragraph or other "chunk" of text -- the idea is not to rush ahead until you have had time to understand and think hard about what you have already read. If you do this, you will never read quickly -- but this style of slow careful attention is a great way to engage well in a philosophical text, a mathematical proof, or a complex poem. In my experience, reading Derrida in this way is more constructie than skimming his texts quickly. Finally, the way you are "supposed" to read any text depends on your own goals -- this slow, laborious strategy is best for texts that you have already decided are worth serious investments of your time and attention. So, I recommend it in this case only if you have alerady decided that engaging intensively in one of Derrida's text is worth it to you.

My dog sometimes acts in an aggressive way because he feels he has to protect my family like we're his pack. I find it interesting that although he lives in an environment very different from what would be natural, he still feels the need to do this because of his instinct. He feels that the world is in his control and is oblivious to politics and other issues that affect the whole world. How do we know that we are any different to my dog? We assume that he knows very little about the world, but he probably thinks the same about us and so how can we know that the world isn't actually being run by him? Or if not by him how do we know that everything we think we control and understand isn't actually in the control of ants, or plants, or stars? Millie =]

I agree that acknowledging that "the mere possibility of doubt doesn't provide a reason for doubting" is one part of a sensible answer to your question: that (1) we aren't sure whether we can prove complete certainty that your dog--or that Allen's scrap of tin-foil--does not control the world, despite all appearances to the contrary, doesn't provide us with (2) a good reason for taking seriously what certainly looks to be an extremely remote possibility. Moreover, and as the reference to tin-foil suggests, (3) there seems something irrational about taking those doubts too seriously. But why do possibilities like these seem easy to ignore or even to dismiss as "crazy thoughts"? Is this just because we are unwilling to challenge received opinion? Is this dismissive stance yet another example of the human tendency to embrace dogmatism? I believe is what a student of mine had in mind as she stormed out of the classroom when I offered this sort of response to similar doubts that she had raised. I...

Hello, I hope you bear with my question despite its Jerry Springer-like context. My boyfriend tells me he has occasional sex with other women in a way that “doesn’t change anything between us.” We’re in a long-distance relationship that is also new, and so far he has demonstrated his loyalty to me whenever another woman advances a claim on him in my presence. I find it impossible to find a rational objection to his having sex with others in such a situation because in substance, if not form, fidelity seems to be present. Yet I am bothered tremendously by his having sex with others. Though promiscuity while being in a relationship is an old and frequently arising issue, in my experience people increasingly seek to deal with it through “full disclosure” that is supposed to enable us to grant or withdraw consent to such an arrangement. The merits of such an approach are realism and honesty, and my particular situation seems to be the scenario in which consent cannot be rationally denied. So how can I make...

I agree with you that honesty in a relationship to preferable to deception, but I disagree with your suggestion that that chosing not to raise your disapproval of your boyfriend's actions amounts to a virtuous realism that acknowledges how hard it is for a committed couple to remain sexually faithful to each other. Louise's reflections on the complexity of human sexuality are excellent ones that should be of great use to you. I have three additional points to make: First, that you appreciate some of your boyfriend's actions (for example, his willingness to refrain from having sex with others when you are present) doesn't mean that you consent to his actions that you find problematical (for example, his willingess to have sex with others when you are absent). Second, that you cannot create an "abstract" argument objecting to your boyfriend's lack of sexual infidelity does not mean that you should not discuss with him what you expect in your relationship and how you experience his actions...

First, thanks for this great website. I was talking to a friend about Descartes and Cogito and it revived my curiosity in the subject. Most of us would agree that there is an objective world out there. Is there a way to prove it? How can I prove to my self that I am not the only thing that exists? I thought perhaps because there is an order in the things around me, in which I have no will. I can not change the laws that the things around me obey, wether they are objective or part of my imagination. Does this force me to admit then that the things I perceive are objective? I could definitely use some help. I would like to read more in the subject as well so if somebody could give me ideas and refer me to some books, it would be great. Thanks in advance. Alejandro

As Saul's response makes clear, Descartes' own reasoning seems to rely heavily on his argument for the existence of God. I think that few today would accept that argument, and so although studying Descartes closely would doubtless be interesting it may not give you a satisfactory answer to your questions. Another form of argumentation that purports to be capable of proving the existence of objects distinct from oneself is transcendental argumentation. This is most closely associated with Immanuel Kant, who developed his famous transcendental argumentation (at least in part) because he was interested in responding to problems with the rationalist philosophical tradition in which Descartes wrote and which was critiqued severely by David Hume. As interesting as Kant's argumentation is--and as fascinating as is an historical account of Kant's responses to his illustrious predecessors--Kant's own argumentation may not help you to find an answer to your question: although Kant answered your...

I used to think that we needed language to think but then babies and animals can think and they don't have a language. I then came to the conclusion that they may not have a verbal language like ours but they use their other senses to have a language and that's why they can think. So would it be possible for a person who had none of the five senses to think? And if we use our senses to think, do plants think? Plants have senses so can they can think to some extent?

It is true that many types of things are repond in systematically recognizable and conistent ways to changes in their environment: including people, other animals, other types of organisms like plants, other living things like cells, and indeed non-living things like thermometers. Philosophers have paid some attention to ways that things like these are sensitive to their environment. To consider the final example, on one epistemological line it is right to say that thermometers represent the temperature because they are sensitive in this manner to changes in temperature. I don't think this position is tantamount to saying that thermometers think, but I'll leave it to partisans of that perspective to say more. One idea that rings true to me comes from the great 20th Century American philosoher Wilfrid Sellars, who drew a distinction between being "senstitive" to one's environment and being "aware" of it. In particular, it seems right to me to conclude that sensitivity plants and cells and...

For giving the students a good picture of a branch of philosophy are classic authors' text, specially very hard ones, replaceable by secondary literature or not?

My experience is that manybeginning students can learn and grow a lot by engaging intensively with primary texts. This engagement is difficult for students and their instructors, but when it occurs it is extremely intellectually rewarding. One of my earliest memories of a student was sitting alone in my college's library reading Hobbes. At one point, I "got it" and began to slow down and think hard and gain a lot from thinking about his ideas and arguments. Another was spending most of a semester discussing one single article--Quine's "Two Dogmas"--with an instrutor who was willing to throw the course syllabus out of the window and discuss those ideas as deeply and for as long as his students wanted. These were both extremely powerful experiences to me, and to my they represent a form of of "deep enagement" that still means a lot of me two decades later. As an eductator, it excites me to help students to learn how to achieve this kind of philosophical engagement, and I think that many...

This question pertains to philosophical education or philosophical pedagogy: Even though I do not hold any degrees in philosophy (I hold undergraduate and graduate degrees in political science), I believe that philosophy should constitute one of the foundations of higher education. It is impossible, I believe, to be truly educated without a sound background in philosophy and logic. To this end, I have always believed that with the wonderful emergence of new technologies it should be incumbent upon every capable institution of higher learning to seek to disseminate such core foundations. This can be done, with remarkable ease these days, through distance learning. However, with the exception of a very small number of philosophy departments associated with certain universities, most departments of philosophy look upon distance learning, seemingly, with great loathing. Furthermore, the thought of actually establishing distance degree programs in philosophy (whether at the undergraduate or graduate...

My sense is that distrust of online learning has faded signficantly overall, andthat suspicion about this type of education ("loathing" seems toostrong, at least in my experience) among philosophers has eased somewhat in recent years. Thatsaid, I think you are right to suggest that relatively few philosophers areinterested in teaching exclusively online courses; there is, however,increasing interest among philospohers I talk to aobut "blended" modalities that combine face-to-faceand online learning. I agree with you and with Allen that there is no good reason whymore philospohy courses could not be taught online. I would also arguethat there is great benefit in doing so: as you suggest, online coursesprovide an excellent opportunity toextend the benefits of higher education to folks who are not wellserved by traditional classes. So, I hope that morephilosophers will be willing to "try out" online courses so that those(potential) students can benefit from all the benefits that accrue...

I would like to know why, after rigorous scientific training in objective observation and reflection, some scientists are very resistant to laying down their preconceptions. One area which springs to mind is the breath-taking complexity of life on earth. This points so clearly to a creator of some kind (hence the ID debate), yet many scientists dismiss this possibility a priori, regarding it as a childish myth. Why this unwillingness to be truly 'scientific' and examine the facts from several possible points of view, rather than one rather dogmatic one?

The answer to your first question about preconceptions is that scientists are human beings and so scientific practice is affected in many ways by human subjectivity. These effects include, but are not limited to, a human tendency towards dogmatisim. Scientific methods and training can limit the damaging effects of human dogmatism, but cannot eliminate them entirely. The answer is your second quetsion about intelligent design is that there are substantive scientific reasons for rejecting this argument for God's existence. Ironically, your assumption that scientists' failure to accept this arguments can only be due to unscientific dogmatism may be based on your own wishful or dogmatic thinking -- it is a mistake to think that the best or even the typical scientific response to the argument from design is dismissing it as a childish myth. Finally, my sense is that scientists and philosopers have explored and assessed this argument from mutliple perspectives, so I think the rational investigation...

Dear Philosophers, Can suicide be seen as pointless if in fact there is no afterlife/conciousness after death? If one ends one's life due to excrutiating pain, would it not be better to "live" with the pain than to not live at all? It seems paradoxical that if one commits suicide to escape something that one's death would not end anything because one cannot "reap the benefits" of no longer living. So would it not be greater to live poorly than to have not lived at all?

Your question assumes that every life is worth living, and that theonly point to ending one's earthly life would be to "trade up" to apresumably better afterlife. But if one's life is so bad that it is notworth living, there is no paradox in preferring oblivion. Your exampleof a life dominated by excruciating case might be an example where somewould find life not worth living; I could imagine that slavery could sodegrade those who are enslaved that their lives seem not worth living.My sense is that the prospect of avoiding future degradation orsuffering gives suicide salience in cases like these, not just theprospect of enjoying a better afterlife. Socrates' discussion of the afterlife in Plato's Apology is a fascinting philosophical discussion of possible attitudes towards the afterlife.

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