Would we be correct to say that, in a sense, Wittgenstein(2) eliminated the need for the Kantian distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal?
I'm thinking more about <i>Remarks on the Foundations on Mathematics</i> and <i>On Certainty</i> and less about the <i>Investigations</i>... More precisely, if all that can be said can be said in natural language alone--therefore in the context of a language game--then aren't we unable to think/speak of a reality "behind" or "outside" of the games? If we can't express "empirical facts" otherwise but within language games, then aren't we unavoidably committed to the rules of one particular game or another?
(If we attempt to deconstruct the way we "play" with phrases such as "the real world" or "the noumenal", can we go further than Nietzsche's allegorical evolution and mystification of the real world in <i>Twilight of Idols</i>?)
Is the noumenal nothing more than something we artificially construct by logical opposition to our mundane experience of knowing, thinking, feeling, experiencing? Does it hold any more fascination for today's professional philosophers? If it was not Wittgenstein that got rid of it for us, who did?