I don't know that anyone's taken a vote on this, but the view that language is required for thought certainly was once a very popular one, and it is still held by many. Perhaps the most famous defense of this view is in Donald Davidson's paper "Thought and Talk". An even more radical view is that language is a prerequisite for conscious experience. This view has been defended by John McDowell, in his book Mind and World and in later papers.

As often in philosophy, this debate often seems to turn on what people mean by certain terms. The key one here is "thought". The claim is not, or need not be, that language is required for any kind of mental state, but rather that it is required for a particular kind of mental state, for which we reserve the term "thought". And once it is clear what "thought" is being used to mean, a good deal of the seemingly radical character of the position evaporates. (That is not true of McDowell's view.)

It is perhaps also worth adding that some psychologists have become attracted to a version of this view. In their hands, thought is conceived as the medium of the central executive, that takes information from disparate sources and integrates it. The empirical hypothesis is then that language plays a special role there.