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ASK A QUESTION RECENT RESPONSES CONCEPT CLOUD
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I found the following statement on a website, along with many other radical philosophies, and just wondered what the panel thought of it.
October 3, 2006
Such a view about legitimate state action often rests on the following sort of argument:
(1) Since coercion is generally wrong, the coercive activities of the state (setting up rules that are backed up by credible threats of punishment) need a special justification. (2) The only such justification that would be possible is the actual or hypothetical prior consent of those to whom the rules apply. (3) No one would reasonably give prior consent to being coerced to act in her own self-interest (except, perhaps, under conditions in which she loses her mental faculties). (4) Therefore, paternalistic laws (those that require citizens to act in ways that further their own self-interest) are unjustified. All three premises of this argument are debatable.
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By way of a partial answer: the phrase 'against his will' in the quotation places the moral stress on the notion of 'informed consent'. But such consent is not an uncontroversial concept. It may that 'the state' has a duty of care with respect to those whose -- or in those situations where -- consent is not or could not be 'informed'. Please see my answer to a previous question for a bit more on this:
http://www.amherst.edu/askphilosophers/question/1157