Response from Peter Lipton on October 26, 2005

The answer to the first question seems to be that there is no contradiction. If there can be free will without omnipotence, then I don't see why there can't be free will with it. There could be an omnipotent creature who decides to leave us alone.

The second question is harder, and it will depend on just how omniscience and foreknowledge are understood. But there are conceptions of God according to which God is outside time and surveys all of history. If this is coherenent (a big 'if', maybe), then it looks like there could be foreknowledge without a fixed future. Or would it not count as foreknowledge if God is outside time?

Response from Sean Greenberg on October 26, 2005

I wanted to add some remarks regarding the relation between divine foreknowledge and free will.

According to most orthodox Christians, the fact that God is omniscient implies that He has foreknowledge. Indeed, if God didn't have foreknowledge, it would be difficult to see how all events could be subject to His providential control, as all orthodox Christians agree.

Depending on how one conceives of free will, tdifferent questions arise regarding the nature of divine foreknowledge. If one holds an incompatibilist view of free will, according to which an agent's choice is free iff that choice is not determined by some preceding cause, then it is difficult to see what basis there is for God's foreknowledge of those free choices. One famous option for reconciling this conception of free will with divine foreknowledge was elaborated by Luis de Molina, and involves an appeal to 'middle knowledge'. Roughly, what the appeal to middle knowledge amounts to is the claim that God knows all possible free choices that agents could make, and so although He does not determine any free choice, He nevertheless knows which choice an agent would make.

The nature of middle knowledge is notoriously difficult to understand. A simpler account of the basis of God's foreknowledge is to assume that He predetermines all choices, but does not compel them, and so foreknows those choices because He knows how those choices are determined to take place. The problem with this response is that it requires that one reject the incompatibilist view of freedom in favor of a compatibilist account. Many committed theists do not believe that compatibilism preserves genuine human freedom.

If you are interested in learning more about Molinism, a very good place to start is with Alfred J. Freddoso's introduction to his translation of Luis de Molina's account of divine foreknowledge, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the "Concordia" (Cornell University Press, 1988).