I am currently studying Existentialism and have come across a statement by

I am currently studying Existentialism and have come across a statement by

I am currently studying Existentialism and have come across a statement by Sartre that appears to suggest that consciousness or being- for- itself is not determined in any manner by being-in-itself (which presumably is absolutely determined). However, the question arises that if the world of objects (being-in-itself) represents the total environment then how it is possible, in the light of recent neurological, genetic and psychological findings (e.g. questioning volitional aspects of freewill) can being-for-itself (i.e. consciousness) not interact with being-in itself? Have I misunderstood the meaning of this idea? All the best Paul C. Clinical Psychologist

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