Why don't determinists believe, at least partially, in the notion of free will? If all events are simply outcomes of antecedent choices and events, wouldn't my decisions now affect me, to some degree, in the future? Thanks for considering this question, as rudimentary as it may seem.

Many philosophers believe in both determinism and the existence of free will. Even more philosophers accept at least the compatibility of determinism and free will: they're known as 'compatibilists' (see this link). Some philosophers go so far as to say that free will requires determinism: see this link. Accepting determinism doesn't by definition imply any particular stand on the existence of free will. That's why the term hard determinist is reserved for those who deny the existence of free will because they accept determinism.

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