Let me add just one small point to Thomas’ very helpful discussion of the role of generalization in moral argument. Why is it that people engage in this odd behavior of challenging your actions by asking you whether you would accept the generalization that all people of type T are entitled to engage in actions of type A? Presumably, it’s because, if true, such generalizations are supposed to reveal some explanatory relationship between certain facts—namely, that it’s in virtue of being of type T that you are entitled to engage in actions of type A. So when a person challenges you with such a generalization, she is really asking you in a roundabout way whether your action has the properties that make it true that it is morally permissible. To respond to the challenge, you must either accept that the properties she picks out really are sufficient to justify the action (such that all actions of that type are morally justified), or pick out other properties of your action that...

I agree with Richard that, to the extent that there is anything to thisidea, it is based on a particular view about the importance of thefamily to human civilization. Traditionally, the family is the social unit inwhich human children are raised, acquire values, and develop moralcharacter (i.e., are civilized). Proponents of the view that you aredescribing make the further assumption that the family is the best social institution for raising children. The idea here is that, inorder to be psychologically healthy, children need to feel confidentthat the adults in their lives will do their best to take care of themand won’t take off whenever they see greener pastures elsewhere. Thenorms of family relationships, unlike the norms that govern other sortsof social relationships, demand such care and count against such“trading up.” And finally, proponents of the view that you describe maintain that, associal institutions for raising children, families are more likely tobe stable and successful when they are...

It seems to me that to call an action selfish is to imply (1) that the agent was motivated solely or primarily by considerations of personal self-interest and (2) the action is contrary to the significant interests of others. (I add this second condition because I don’t think that we would be inclined to call a person selfish if, say, he worked on a crossword puzzle simply because he enjoyed the activity and the only harm that he caused to others was the distaste his friends felt at the thought of his indulgence in this activity.) I can see why it might be contrary to the interests of a political party for an MP to vote against the party line, but it doesn’t follow that the MP’s action was selfish. If, for example, the MP opposed the party primarily because she believed that the party line was contrary to the interests of the citizens of Britain, then her vote would not be selfish because her act would not be motivated solely or even primarily by considerations of self-interest. In fact, she...

When we’re attracted to a principle of equality of opportunity, we’re often moved by the thought that everyone should have the same chance to gain access to the good things of life. Of course, if people blow their chances, then they have no one to blame but themselves; but they might reasonably complain if their access to the good things of life is due to factors over which they have no control. But what, then, about my access to the NBA? I’m 5' 2", and while not entirely graceless, I’m not exactly the picture of athleticism. Is it unfair that the NBA excludes me from its ranks? It’s surely not my fault that I have the height that I have. So has the NBA violated some right that I have to equal opportunity? The reasoning here, of course, goes much too quickly. It seems entirely appropriate that access to jobs is determined by one’s ability to do the job well (even if one’s ability to do a particular job is due to factors outside of one’s own control). We wouldn’t want surgeons or even...