I would like to distinguish two questions: (1) In any given case, is the mere difference between killing and letting die morally significant? and (2) From the point of view of public policy, should we draw a distinction between killing and letting die? I am convinced by the arguments that James Rachels provides in "Active and Passive Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975) against the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die per se. Through an examination of different cases, Rachels argues persuasively that when you hold all other factors equal (consequences, motive of the agent, consent of the person whose life is at stake), the mere difference between killing and letting die is morally insignificant. We tend to believe that there is a significant difference between this act (killing) and omission (letting die), because in most cases, these other factors are not equal. Usually people who kill have malicious intent and create significant harm;...

In Plato’s Phaedo , Socrates explains to his friends why, in the face of his imminent execution, he is in a good mood. His whole life, he reports, has been a preparation for death (64a-b): after he dies, his soul will be separated from his body, and he will finally be able to attain the only thing of genuine value– knowledge of the forms (65b-e, 66b-67b, 69a-b). If Socrates is right, Cebes rightly asks, why shouldn’t we all commit suicide? (61b) Because, Socrates rather lamely responds, we are the property of the gods, and they should decide when we die (62b-c). Without such a view about the property rights of the gods, Cebes’ question is difficult for a person like the Socrates of the Phaedo to answer. We might think that suicide would be wrong because in death we are unable to meet our responsibilities to others, but what sense can one make of these responsibilities, if they, too, would be better off dead? Despite what Socrates suggests about the extraordinary virtues of...

Of course, murder is not a victimless crime! But how can that be, Alex asks, if the victim no longer exists in order to suffer the harm that has been done to him? If you must exist in order to have interests, then how can a dead person’s interests suffer as a result of his death? To see the harm that is suffered by a murder victim, let’s think first about what it means to be harmed. If I were to harm Harry, what sort of thing would I have to do him? Intuitively, when I harm Harry, my actions make him worse off than he would have been had I not acted as I did. So when I spread vicious gossip about Harry, I have harmed him because, had I not spread the vicious gossip, his reputation would have been intact, and he would have been well-respected in his community, loved by his family, and able to complete more easily certain projects about which he cares deeply, projects that require the good will and cooperation of others. Because of my vicious gossip, Harry is now a social outcast, unloved and unaided...

I think that there are two explanations for why we fear death: (1)animals who fear death are more likely to survive and reproduce thananimals who do not, and so, it’s likely that our fear of death is basicand innate, and (2) many of us value our lives: we enjoy and value theactivities and experiences that constitute our lives, we enjoy our relationships, wewant to be around to share the joys and lessen the pain of our lovedones, and we simply want to know how things turn out. Of course, if ourlife is painful, empty, and worthless, if we care about nothing that depends on our efforts, and if we don’t anticipate thatthings will improve soon, or soon enough, then life can be a burden andwe can fear its continuation more than its end. Fortunately, I think,life is rarely like that.