Does music create emotion, or does it bring to the surface existing emotions?

Music can certainly bring about emotions, and I think it can also make us conscious of ones that we already have. It may bring about emotions in a variety of ways. A work of music may remind us of something and produce emotion in that way, or it may move us when we recognize its quality or expressive power, or it may encourage us to imagine certain things and--in so doing--arouse emotion. An interesting question is whether we should understood the expressive nature of certain pieces of music in terms of their tendency to arouse emotions. Simply put: Are works of music sad because they are disposed to make us sad? I think there are reasons to doubt this. For example, it seems to me that one may recognize the sadness of a piece of music w/out feeling any inclination to sadness--and that this is true even under the best listening conditions. That certainly doesn't settle the issue, but it does suggest that we should look for an account of the expressive qualities of music in some other place. ...

In art or design, why do certain combinations of color, shape, contrast, font, etc., strike more visual impact and/or seem more appealing than others? There are certain standbys or principles of design that seem to be successful (e.g., appropriate white space, complementary colors, etc.), yet it also seems entirely subjective as to what we find beautiful in artistic realms. Is there any generalizability to the quality of visual appeal?

I want to emphasize that the question of the subjectivity of beautyis distinct from the question of whether there are rules or principlesabout beauty. Many aestheticians are particularists. They believe thatthere are no general rules or principles governing what makes thingsbeautiful, and that what may count towards beauty or aesthetic merit inone context may be aesthetically irrelevant in another context (or mayeven count against overall beauty or merit). But this is consistentwith such a view that judgments of beauty are more than merelysubjective. Kant is famous for having arguing that there can be no rules or principles of taste in his Critique of Judgment .Interesting contemporary discussion of the possibility ofgeneralizations regarding beauty and artistic merit can be found inMary Mothersill's book Beauty Restored . Mothersill isskeptical of there being any interesting generalizations here, but I'mnot convinced by her arguments. What about the principles of design that are...

I don't think there's much reason to think that what we find beautiful in artistic realms is entirel ysubjective . Our judgments of beauty do not seem to be pure matters ofpersonal preference (e.g., like whether you prefer sushi to fish andchips). There's at least the appearance of reason-giving and/orjustification when we talk about beautiful art. For example, we oftencan say something when we are asked why we judge something tobe beautiful. And we often treat disagreement about judgements ofbeauty as, well, real disagreement. We may find ourselves surprisedwhen we run across someone who disagrees with our judgment that a workof art is beautiful. We are often tempted--at least initially--to tryto explain away disagreement about artistic beauty by appeal to somefailing in one of the parties (e.g., a failure of attention, a lack ofsensitivity). We sometimes offer explanations in terms of the beauty ofcertain objects. All of these features make it seem as if the domain isnot one which is purely...

If you put a flower, next to a painting of a flower, would the painting be more beautiful because it has been intentionally drawn? A still life is seen as having more aesthetic value than a flower in a vase, although our eyes see no difference between the two.

It isn't quite right that we see no difference between a flower or a bunch of flowers and a standard still life. For example, we see paintings as largely flat, and we take notice of their painted surfaces. This distinguishes our experience of them from our experience of flowers. More importantly, we typically value the two sorts of objects in different ways. A still life might be valued because of its beauty but also because of the skill of the painter, its capacity to express and evoke emotion, what it symbolizes, and/or the perspective on the world it manifests. That is, we value paintings as works of art, not as mere aesthetic objects. (Beauty is not our only concern when we look at paintings of flowers.) While we sometimes value bouquets of flowers for what they express, the art of flower arrangement does not seem to have the rich capacity for expression and meaning that painting does. The same is true for mere bunches of flowers. So the answer to your original question...

Is there any use to examining aesthetics independently of medium?

Yes. Some aesthetic questions are about natural beauty, and the notion of medium does not apply in the natural context. There are philosophial questions about artistic genres (e.g., how do horror and suspense work?), and it may be worthwhile to consider those independently of the specific media in which those genres are instantiated. Philosophical investigation into the objectivity of aesthetic and artistic value seem largely independent of concern for medium. Also, an overemphasis on medium can be misleading. For example, film and television are plausibly different media, but they function in very similar ways. It can be useful to think of them as two species of a larger category (the moving image).

As photography and film give accurate images of the world around us or an imaginary world, and as they use symbolism, explain concepts and can produce beauty, is there any room left for traditional art?

There's plenty of room left for traditional art. Why? Because the arts aren't really in competition for room. Painting can give accurate images, represent an imaginary world, use symbolism, etc., but that doesn't mean there isn't room for sculpture, literature, photography, film, theater, dance, etc. Why wouldn't there be room for them? If it were the case that each art had a distinctive function, then it might seem that the invention of an art that could perform all artistic functions would render those other arts superfluous. But this would be mistaken. Swiss army knives haven't rendered screwdrivers and bottle-openers superfluous. Moreover, the individual arts don't work like that--they don't each have distinctive functions. Each one of them can do a variety of things--and it is up to artists to show us what can be done while working in those forms.

Does science depend on philosophy, or vice versa? What does it mean that philosophers are taking the role of theoretical scientists? Thanks.

I suppose I don't think philosophy (in general) depends on science, nor does it seem plausible that science depends on philosophy. With respect to the former--it's hard to see how science could possibly help very much with a range of philosophical issues (e.g., vagueness, the nature of modality, the metaphysics of mathematical entities or musical works). And it's also hard to see how science (in general) could depend on philosophy. What would that amount to? Scientific investigation doesn't seem as if it has to wait on (or for) philosophical approval. But this doesn't mean the two don't have anything to do with one another. Much of the most interesting recent philosophy (at least the philosophy that interests me) is profoundly influenced and inspired by science--it looks to science for data to be accommodated, it is inspired by scientific theorizing (i.e., it is explanatory rather than analytic), and it holds consistency with our best scientific theories to be one of the most important criteria...

Is the experience of thoughts as predominantly verbal universal, or nearly so? What alternatives are there?

Temple Grandin (a high-functioning autistic who is a professor of animal science at Colorado State) describes herself as 'thinking in pictures' rather than linguistically. Her book Thinking in Pictures is quite interesting.

Why would the golden ratio be aesthetically pleasing to humans?

I'm not convinced that the golden ratio really is aesthetically pleasing to humans. See a special issue of Empirical Studies of the Arts (Volume Fifteen, Issue Two), 1997, which has a number of articles in it that challenge the idea that the Golden Ratio (or Golden Section) is really pleasing/preferred.
Art

What is not art?

Lots of things: the orange in front of me, the bus outside my window, George Bush, the number four, Palo Duro Canyon, and so on. I suspect you want to know what makes something not art, and that might seem like it calls for supplying a definition of art. Once we knew what the defintion was, we could presumably determine what didn't fall into the category. For a number of reasons, I suspect that this isn't the best way to go. (For one thing, I don't think philosophy has a great track record at supplying informative and accurate definitions.) Still, it seems that we are pretty good at distinguishing art from non-art, and that should do in most cases. For interesting attempts to provide a definition of art take a look at any of the essays on the institutional theory of art by George Dickie, or look at Arthur Danto's Transfiguration of the Commonplace. For general discussion of the issues surrounding defining art you might take a look at Noel Carroll's Philosophy of Art: A...

Why do some people have "good taste" and others have "bad taste"?

What a can of worms! To my mind, the most interesting philosophical work on the subject is David Hume’s wonderful essay “Of the Standard of Taste”. Humeargues that there are a number of criteria for what counts as being a‘true judge’ of the arts (that is, someone who has good taste). Here’s Hume summing up his account of true judges in that essay: “ Strongsense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected bycomparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics tothis valuable character…." Hume’s views (although they are controversial) seem pretty plausible. For example, it does seem that practice with—and experience of—a form of art is crucial to being a good judge of it. Prejudice (e.g., an unwillingness to put aside one’s own personal concerns) may certainly keep one from being a good judge. Areasonable degree of intellectual capacity (as exemplified in acapacity...

Pages