We live in a world that contains much tragedy and it is difficult to determine the scope of an individual's responsibility for these events, especially in the case of preventable deaths (death due to starvation when there is surplus agriculture). I suggest that the cause and cure for such tragic loss involves both indivudual and collective action. Often war, greed and corruption are at the roots of poverty, which can be accentuated due to drought, flooding, and other natural dissasters, especially when relief is in short supply. According to some philosophers, not to go to the aid of someone whom you could save (from starvation, for example) would be the moral equivalent of killing them. For a very throrough case that current world poverty calls for radical action (lest we turn out to be moral monsters) you might look at Peter Unger's Living High, And Letting Die. But probably most philosophers think there is a moral difference between an act (killing) and an omission (letting die) in many...

Thank you for your kind words about this site! Your question is very difficult. To pick up your last suggestion: if there is an all good Creator who sustains the cosmos, and this G-d commands that the hungry be fed, then there would be an obligation for those with surplus food to give to those in famine. Under these circumstances, taking food from those with surplus would involve compelling them to do (or let happen) what was their obligation. This line of reasoning will only take us so far, however, not only due to doubts about God's existence and commands (doubts I do not share, by the way, but there is doubt) but because nowhere in the Hebrew Bible, Christian new Testament or Qur'an is there what appears to be a divinely revealed precept that one may kill to get food. As for the suggestion that it may be "the best philosophers" who decide what is right, I am afraid there is some disagreement. Some philosophers argue for stringent distributive justice and egalitarianism: there should be (as much...

Good question! If one could not imagine oneself slaughtering an animal for food under any circumstances, then perhaps one should reflect on whether one's reluctance stems from a realization (deep down) that there is something morally disquieting or even wrong about killing animals for food. Still, the reason for the reluctance might rest on non-moral grounds (due to a childhood accident, one cannot stand the site of blood) and reflect a deep personal preference (perhaps one cannot imagine ever being a plumber or sanitation worker, but one still believes that the vocation of being a plumber or sanitation worker are good and vital for society). Flipping the question around, though, it might be noted that even if one can conceive of oneself slaughtering animals for food, and doing so happily, that alone would not be a reason to think that such slaughtering is good or morally permissible.

Great question! Replying to the question will depend on the kind of "right" you have in mind. Consider three areas: politics, education, and the general issue of integrity. In a pluralistic democracy that respects basic liberties, you may have to tolerate (though to tolerate is not necessarily to respect) demonstrably false beliefs unless there is serious reason to believe that they will lead to actual (not merely potential) harm. So, it seems there is no obstacle for most world democracies today to insure that overt racism is not cultivated by any public institutions and to make it difficult (if not impossible) for private institutions to cultivate racism, especially when this is harming the innocent. But it will not be easy to directly control what people think or believe using political tools (how might a government insure that no citizen ever believes their horoscope?). The government can and most governments do control certification processes involving medicine and health, and so there are...

Great question! You have definitely (in my view) described a disturbing emotional indifference or numbness, but this may not be due to any moral wrong. People might be in such a condition because they have suffered some great trauma or brain injury through no fault of their own. Philosophers have differed in terms of their view of how natural it is for us to empathetic or have sympathy for one another --Aristotle and Locke think we are desposed to care for one another whereas Hobbes almost sees friendship as something we are drawn to for reasons of prudence and self-concern (caring for others is a kind of strategy for us to avoid premature violent death). In natural law theory, lack of concern for the dead or an indifference to personal failure or failing to honor family may be seen as failures to exercise important human virtues (whether or not this is due to a vice or an innocent injury). But some philosophers in ancient Greece taught that we should try to give up desires and attachments --not all...

The status of morality does have an important role in some arguments for and against theistic belief and it has an important place in developing almost any comprehensive account of human nature, other animals and the cosmos. If indeed there are objective moral rights and wrongs, goods and ills, virtues and vices, we need (at some point in our inquiry) to explore the origin of such values and their implications. From a theistic point of view (common to classical Judaism, Christianity, Islam and theistic forms of Hinduism), such values do not emerge from value-less, non-purposive causes. Utlimately, values (like the cosmos itself) are grounded in a teleological, purposive, good Creator. Naturalism (in most forms today) conceives of the cosmos in fundamentally non-teleological forces and needs to account for how such values emerge. For a constructive theistic moral argument, you might consider the work of Mark Linville, Paul Copan, C. Stephen Evans or see the entry on naturalism on the recent Cambridge...

I'm not sure that ignorance is bliss, but perhaps an extreme form of ignorance (in which you are ignorant of your responsibilities and duties) might lead to a life unburdened by any sense of duty or any call to do good. You are probably not going to aid those in peril or seek to contribute to the lives of those you love if you are completely ignorant of values. In any event, some philosophers have taken very stringent views on lying (especially Augustine and Kant) and they would hold that it is wrong to engage in lying with others as well as (if it is possible) with yourself. The reason for a slight qualification about lying to yourself is that it seems to involve a paradox: a liar needs to get the one deceived to believe something that the liar thinks is false. Deceiving oneself would then seem to involve a person believing something and not believing the same thing at the same time, an apparent contradiction. The paradox of self-deception to one side, there are dangers of what might be called...

A very sensitive and important set of questions! There is some divide among philosophers on this matter at present. Some philosophers (Richard Swinburne, for example) think that you should not forgive someone unless they actually ask for forgiveness, repent, and reform. This seems too extreme, in my view. I had a student who claimed she could never forgive her father for comitting suicide, because her father ceased to be and there could be no reconciliation. That seems too extreme, because even if there is no reconciliation on earth or elsewhere, there are still ways in which one may forgive (not hold a grudge or, worse, not be in a rage about) the one who injured you. Other philosophers (I think this would include Jeffrey Murphy) believe that the injured party can forgive (even without confession and repentance by the one who committed the wrong) but that he / she should not forgive right away. Just taking up the "forgive and forget" role right away may be a reflection that one did not really...

This is a very deep question! The answer depends upon the existence and scope of what are ofted called positive and negative rights. A negative right involves others having a duty to not do certain things. Arguably, the right to free speech is a negative right, for it involves others restraining themselves from silencing others. If you do have a right to free speech, the world owes you a certain amount of restraint and non-interference (e.g. presumably the right to free speech is not absolute and must be weighed agains other rights such as property rights, the right to life...). Positive rights involve positive duties that others have toward you. Arguably, the right to life would require the world to provide you food if you needed food to survive and this need was not voluntarily assumed (e.g. you did not voluntarily go on a hunger strike) and the world had surplus food. There is controversy over the status of some rights and duties. For example, does everyone have a duty or a right to attain...

William: I think Professor Antony's reply is deep and commendable. I would only add a minor point about self-ownership or the thesis that one's life only belongs to one's self. "Belonging" can involve property rights (this house belongs to me) but it can also refer to what is good for a person (e.g. he belongs in a hospital, she belongs in a great school, etc). If you step back from your current state (a very difficult act of abstraction, I agree!), can you see that you belong in a caring, curative therapeutic process? I think if you can begin to begin seeing that, you can see a different path than self-destruction. In a way, part of an answer to your question will involve not just a matter of liberalism versus a conservative, paternalistic form of governance, but it will involve a philosophy of values and one's overall understanding of the cosmos. For example, one of the reasons Christian philosophers historically opposed suicide (even the dignified suicide of Lucretius which was valorized in...