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Ethics

What form of accountability should non-action take? How guilty are bystanders?

Great question, but to really give a proper response we might have to consider specific cases or types of cases. In general, however, it may be said that utilitarians tend to give the same ranking to an act and an omission or failure to act. A utilitarian thinks right action is the action that will produce the best consequences (utility, happiness, pleasure....) and they tend to think that if failing to act brings about the same bad effects as acting, then the two are on an equal footing in terms of accountability. This is a radical position, however, and while there are some cases when it seems plausible there are many cases when it seems unreasonable. Maybe a person's not giving to famine relief will mean that a person will die of starvation and surely that is bad, but is it as bad as the person actively hunting down and killing the person? If you would like to engage a philosopher who tends to equate acts and omissions, check out the work of Peter Singer.
Ethics

I think of forgiveness as a central principle around which I base my behavior. Lately I have been feeling as though many people close to me take advantage of my generous forgiveness by intentionally doing things that hurt me (not physically) and then offering superficial apologies, knowing that I will forgive them. Is there an ethical justification for forgiveness? If so, does it offer any insight onto the practical application of when and how to forgive and where to set limits?

Great question! There is actually a significant literature out now on the philosophy of forgiveness and some significant controversy over whether and when forgiveness should or should not be given. One of the most prominent philosophers to contribute to the philosophy of forgiveness is Jeffrie Murphy and he definitely thinks that one should not forgive very easily. He thinks that someone who almost always forgives wrongs may lack self-respect or may even have self-hatered or self-deception. Richard Swinburne agrees and he argues that one should not forgive another person unless the person has confessed and repented. I think that is too extreme. Someone may harm us and then die, making confession and reform impossible and yet (it seems to me) one can still forgive the wrong-doer. Still, Swinburne has a point in that if the person does not confess or even ask for forgiveness there is little chance there could be a full restoration of a relationship. So, in your case, I suggest you might consider at...
Ethics

I'm writing to find out if anyone would care to comment about the ethical considerations involved when the news media, political organizations and/or companies and corporations respond to private criticisms made to social media outlets by the average Joe exercising free speech within its legal limits. I've seen increasing examples of organized groups publicly reacting to individuals' negative or critical comments (which were not directly aimed at them or intended to be viewed by the general public) not only to simply respond or defend themselves, but to fulfill or further their political agendas and promote their ideology (in other words, to use the individuals as scapegoats). The definitions of both libel and the First Amendment are generally clear, defining the limitations of "free" speech in the U.S. It seems to me extremely unethical (if not bullying and violent) for organized groups to react to critical social media postings by thrusting the individuals who made them into the national spotlight and...

I am inclined to agree. The issues are complex ( of course) so I will do less in offering your an analysis and more in the way of making a recommendation: I highly recommend the book Journalistic Ethics: Moral Responsibility and the Media by philosopher Dale Jacquette. Dale does a terrific job on such cases.
Ethics
Sex

My girlfriend and I have recently moved to a new area, and have encountered an unfortunate problem. In this area, the birth control pill is only available upon prescription by a gynecologist, and gynecologists are required by law to refuse handing out the prescription until after a woman has undergone a standard checkup. Normally, this doesn't seem like such a big deal, but my girlfriend has only been to a gynecologist once and adamantly refuses to do so again, as she is afraid the check-up will be horribly painful. She has, in fact, declared that we should simply stop having sex until we find a way to acquire the pill without her undergoing a gynecological check-up (we only ever use double-protection, condom and pill, to try and minimize the risk of unwanted pregnancies); her only idea is to get her mother (who works in a pharmacy) to send birth control pills per post. If that doesn't work, it looks like I'm in for a dry spell. I am confused as to what I am allowed to do, ethically speaking. I know...

Tough to say. Off hand it seems that trying to convince her to have such a check-up is profoundly to act in her interest in terms of her fundamental health. Also, it certainly seems that desiring to have a healthy sex life is not something that "taints" or should taint the boyfriend - girlfriend relationship. You mention "authority" --which is an interesting term here, but it may not be out of place. I suppose in a close friendship, we do give authority to our friends to offer (even unasked for) advice. But that authority does seem to be limited by an acceptance of one's friend's or partner's independent judgment. You write about accepting "whatever she decides to do with her own body." That does seem right, don't you think? You cannot (with justice) compel her or trick her into having the check-up, and that leaves you with deciding what the future of your relationship will be like (under the conditions you both commit to) or to decide whether you even wish to continue being in such a relationship...
Children
Ethics
Punishment

John is 30 years old. Jack is 10 years old. They are clinically sane. One day, John feels a sudden, uncharacteristic urge to kill. He murders an innocent stranger. On the same day, Jack feels the same urge to kill. He also murders an innocent stranger. John and Jack both admit responsibility for the murders. They acted in the same way for the same reason. Their actions had the same result. Should they be punished in the same way?

Great question! In practice, at least in the United States, the punishment and even the trial will be different. The 10 year old would be tried in juvenile court. The jury would not be made up of only 10 year olds. John, on the other hand, would have a jury (if there was a jury) of fellow adults or peers, and the possible consequences would be different. I suggest that one reason for a difference in punishment is that while both John and Jack admit responsibility (which I assume involves admitting that they knew that what they did was wrong) the child (and a 10 year old is a child, based on international standards, e.g. UN definition of childhood) did not have as full of a grasp of the wrongness of the action as the adult. It may also be the case that the child had / has less resources mentally to address deviant desires / urges. I think we expect adults to engage in greater self-mastery, to exercise greater restraint and control of desires than children. Although the claim may seem odd: sanity...
Education
Ethics

Is it fair to force someone to learn even if it is for their own good?

Well, in many countries attending school up to a given age is not voluntary; penalties are in the offing for not doing so. The justification is often articulated in terms of the good of the person who is forced to learn --such education will enable her or him to work, make a living, make decisions for themselves, the education might help the person not to be exploited, and so on. But the justification is sometimes more in terms of the good of a society at large. In a healthy democracy, for example, it is good to have citizens who are sufficiently educated who can understand political, economic, and social policies and vote in light of an informed, reasonable evaluation of the alternatives. I personally think that this practice and enforced education is defensible, but your question raises interesting further questions. How far can a nation state go in terms of imposing instructions? In the USA and the UK, it seems that the state is virtually compelling tobacco users to learn that smoking...
Ethics

In a recent question / answer, it was asked "how can a person know that an action is immoral, yet do it anyway?" and the response was "a person can 'know' things on different levels and so can engage in self-deception." I have a question about the response, which then leads to a deeper more qeneral question. Suppose a person knows that an action is immoral, yet does it anyway. Might that not indicate that the person [at least in this instance] does not care whether s/he behaves in a moral manner? and where does the concept of 'evil' stand in philosophy, and how might the concept of 'evil' explain this apparent disparity?

I hesitate to reply to this question because I think you are replying to my response to the question about akrasia, a case in which persons with "moral weakness" appear to do what they seem to know is evil, and it would probably be best to hear from a different philosopher. I may not be utterly useless, however, in first bringing to your attention something on the philosophical horizon. I am one of the general co-editors (along with Chad Meister) of a six volume work called The History of Evil for Acumen Press in the UK involving over a 100 philosophers and so I feel that I can report something of interest: in four years, you should have available a massive set of works by philosophers of all different persuasions on evil. This, of course, does not answer your question, but I could not resist spreading the word that questions about the nature and concept and reality of evil is on the minds of many philosophers today (and in some respects these books are being written for you, readers of...
Ethics

Is it possible to truly, completely understand and know that a certain act is unethical or immoral, and yet still do it (absent any external pressures, or internal pathologies like psychopathy)? Or is it so that full knowledge of immorality exclude one from acting immorally, and that a person who behaves immorally actually doesn't understand the immorality of their actions?

You have identified the classic problem of AKRASIA (Greek for incontinence) and arguments that go back to Socrates' close connection between knowledge and ethics. Socrates and his student Plato, and Plato's student Aristotle, each found it puzzling how someone can do an act that he or she knows to be wrong. I actually share in this intuition because it is very hard to describe how an agent might willingly do what he or she fully and consciously acknowledges to be wrong. Arguably, if someone knows something (say, stealing from the vulnerable) is wrong, they thereby disapprove of it. So, when someone steals from the vulnerable they would have to simultaneously do the stealing (and thus on some level approve of it) while at the same time disapprove of it. The best way to address the issue (I suggest) and avoid thinking that all immoral agents either don't know what they are doing or they are pathological or subject to external forces, is to claim that we can know things on different levels and be...
Emotion
Ethics

Actions can obviously be unethical, but what about emotions, or opinions? If you have an opinion or an emotion but do not act on them in an unethical way, can they still be unethical? Is hate, for example, an unethical emotion? Is the opinion that illegal immigrants should be shot at the border an unethical opinion, if one does not in any way act on this opinion or political support such measures?

There seem to be forms of hedonistic utilitarianism (maximize pleasure) that might allow for the permissibility of unethical opinions, provided they are not likely to lead to acts of great disutility and the one who has such opinions enjoys holding them. That, in any case, was once advanced as an objection to J.J.C. Smart's brand of utilitarianism. But I suggest it is difficult to insure that unethical opinions don't impact our action. Someone who thinks illegal immigrants should be shot may not do any shooting, but he or she might injure or harm an immigrant, given the chance. Also, ethics (in the west and east) is often (though not always) cast in terms of love and hate one is to love justice, hate cruelty. Someone with the unethical opinions you describe --wanting to shoot illegal immigrants rather than merely prevent them entering one's country seems to be someone who is loving cruelty. And I think many of us do think that cruel desires and pleasures are ethically repulsive in themselves. ...
Ethics

Robert Nozick compared taxes to forced labor, on the grounds that taking money away from people forces them to work for more money. Is forced labor always objectionable? Suppose my city holds one day a year where everyone (with obvious exceptions for extenuating circumstances) is required to pick up litter. Would this be unethical? Is there an important difference between slavery and compulsory labor?

It is an honor to address this question as Nozick was one of my professors (and I must say he was an outstanding, funny, wise teacher). On my dear professor: You may be right about Nozick, though he did allow for a minimal state which would have required some (again, perhaps minimal) taxation and thus Nozick may have thought some forced labor is (as I think it is) sometimes quite justified. On the difference between slavery and forced labor and whether forced labor is always objectionable: I suggest that slavery and forced labor differ, as you could have a slave whom you do not compel to engage in labor / work and you could compel someone to work whom you do not claim as your personal property. There might be emergency conditions when, for example, you are on a boat in a storm and the captain requires everyone to work to save the ship (imagine any who refulse to work are thrown overboard). Many people believe that when a nation is under attack, that nation may (rightly) elect to compel its...

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