Recent Responses
Reviews for Russell's History of Western Philosophy are all over the map. I get that he's an early positivist, and since his book is written from this particular perspective it will turn away people who are really into Hegel, Kierkegaard, etc. But one would not expect a book about philosophy written by a guy like Russell to include much on Hegel, right? Likewise, one wouldn't expect to find much Russell in a survey of philosophy written by Foucault, right? So I guess I'm asking this: if one generally likes Russell, will this individual benefit from reading his History of Western Philosophy, or is it too full of poor generalizations such that it obfuscates history more than sheds light upon it? Did that question make sense? I hope so.
Sean Greenberg
October 19, 2010
(changed October 19, 2010)
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Russell's History of Western Philosophy, while consistently entertaining, and worth reading on that score, is not a reliable source for knowledge about the philosophers it treats. The work may be not altogether unfairly described as one of the several 'shilling shockers' that Russell, who... Read more
How can one determine whether anything has intrinsic or innate value? Would we not, in all cases, be forced to concede that a person could theoretically say that they hold the object in question to have no value at all?
Richard Heck
October 18, 2010
(changed October 18, 2010)
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I don't work on this sort of thing, so I won't comment upon the question how one might actually decide whether something has intrinsic value. But I will comment on the overall orientation of the question. It seems to be assumed that, if someone could deny that the object has any value, then... Read more
I presently working through Grayling's Introduction to Philosophical Logic (Blackwell), after studying philosophy at university in the late 1960s. Can anyone recommend a follow-on text (for when I feel I have assimilated this book)? (I have seen the interesting replies to the August post about further reading on symbolic logic.) Peter
Richard Heck
October 18, 2010
(changed October 18, 2010)
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There aren't a whole lot of textbooks on this sort of thing. A more current text is John Burgess's Philosophical Logic. And, depending upon your interests, you might have a look at something like Graham Priest's Introduction to Non-classical Logic. Working through a serious textbook on modal... Read more
I have two question abouts logic. In occidental thought, logic generally is presented as bi-polar (no pun intended); however, I am not quite sure of the 'correct' formulation. Is it: either "A is true," or "not A is true" or is it: Either "A is true," or "A is not true." and if you could expand on the distinction a little perhaps? More interesting, to me, is that I have heard the assertion that there also exists a "quadrant" logical system that also works. Either: "A is true" or " Not A is true" or "Neither A nor Not A are true" or "Both A nor Not A are true" This latter form of logic seems to work for things like polarization of light, for example (if you have a vertical polarizer in front of a horizontal polarizer, no light gets through; but if you insert a polarizer at a 45 degree angle in between the two, some light gets through). I can think of some other examples as well; I prefer to hear your responses.
Richard Heck
October 18, 2010
(changed October 18, 2010)
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Classical logic (at least, understood from the perspective of classical semantics) rests in part upon the so-called "law of bivalence". This is usually formulated as: Every formula is either true or false. To put it slightly differently, we can begin with the idea (which emerges from Frege)... Read more
Theists often claim that it is impossible that the universe just randomly "sprang into existence" out of nothing, for no reason. M-theory posits a cosmological world-view in which an infinite number of universes are continually coming into and going out of existence within the framework of an eternal multiverse. If correct, does this disprove the theist argument?
Richard Heck
October 18, 2010
(changed October 18, 2010)
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I would have thought that the obvious theistic response would be that it is the existence of the eternal multiverse that is at issue. I.e., why are there any universes rather than none? From what I've read of Hawking's response to this, it does not seem to me to be very impressive. As usual... Read more
I have been reading discussions on this site about the Principia and about Godel's incompleteness theorem. I would really like to understand what you guys are talking about; it seems endlessly fascinating. I was an English/history major, though, and avoided math whenever I could. Consequently I have never even taken a semester of calculus. The good news (from my perspective) is that I have nothing to do for the rest of my life except for working toward the fulfillment of this one goal I have: to plow through the literature of the Frankfurt School and make sense of it all. Understanding the methods and arguments of logicians would seem to provide a strong context for the worldview that inspired Horkheimer, Fromm, et al. So yeah, where should I start? Do I need to get a book on the fundamentals of arithmetic? Algebra? Geometry? Or do books on elementary logic do a good job explaining the mathematics necessary for understanding the material? As I said, I'm not looking for a quick solution. I have plenty of time on my hand. So, any advice would be awesome. Thanks.
Peter Smith
October 16, 2010
(changed October 16, 2010)
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1. I don't think there is any reason to suppose that learning about mathematical logic from Principia to Gödel will be any help at all in understanding what is going on with the Frankfurt School. (The only tenuous connection I can think of is that the logical positivists were influenced by de... Read more
I have been reading discussions on this site about the Principia and about Godel's incompleteness theorem. I would really like to understand what you guys are talking about; it seems endlessly fascinating. I was an English/history major, though, and avoided math whenever I could. Consequently I have never even taken a semester of calculus. The good news (from my perspective) is that I have nothing to do for the rest of my life except for working toward the fulfillment of this one goal I have: to plow through the literature of the Frankfurt School and make sense of it all. Understanding the methods and arguments of logicians would seem to provide a strong context for the worldview that inspired Horkheimer, Fromm, et al. So yeah, where should I start? Do I need to get a book on the fundamentals of arithmetic? Algebra? Geometry? Or do books on elementary logic do a good job explaining the mathematics necessary for understanding the material? As I said, I'm not looking for a quick solution. I have plenty of time on my hand. So, any advice would be awesome. Thanks.
Peter Smith
October 16, 2010
(changed October 16, 2010)
Permalink
1. I don't think there is any reason to suppose that learning about mathematical logic from Principia to Gödel will be any help at all in understanding what is going on with the Frankfurt School. (The only tenuous connection I can think of is that the logical positivists were influenced by de... Read more
If we apply nihilism to all knowledge, how is the paradox it creates overcome, as to deny an existence of knowledge is to stand by something known to oneself? Wittgenstein's idea to kick away the ladder seems to some what fill the void but it isn't exactly a satisfying filler!
Andrew Pessin
October 15, 2010
(changed October 15, 2010)
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hm. why can't we methodically critique the possibility of knowledge in various domains w/o ever explicitly addressing the question of whether we can 'know' that knowledge (in general) is impossible? or, is it really self-contradictory (a paradox) to claim that all knowledge is impossible,... Read more
This is a response to an answer given by Miriam Solomon (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/3533). In her response Miriam claims that "...in the 16th century, it was against the laws of nature to claim that Earth moves around the sun." Surely this is missing the point. It was not against the laws of nature but against the contemporary "theories" (*approximations* of the laws of nature) in science. Therefore it was not the laws that were wrong (as she claims), but the theories. Furthermore, to develop upon the original question; the existence of ghosts contradicts currently-held theories of science but also the very conception of ghosts is *self-contradictory*. (For example; If ghosts are capable of physically interacting with their environment they are subject to the action-reaction law of classical mechanics. But if they are capable of travelling through solid objects they do not exert force upon their environment and are not subject to said law: a contradiction.) From this perspective isn't asking "what evidence do we have for the existence of ghosts"? the same as asking ("what evidence do we have for the existence of square-circles"?)?
Andrew Pessin
October 15, 2010
(changed October 15, 2010)
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Haven't read the original exchange, but in response to the contradictions point: sure if you define ghosts that way then they may be self-contradictory, thus impossible. But then philosophers of science talk about cases where you begin with one cnoception of a thing and then as science/th... Read more
Is there a fallacy where claim P is made, but the reply is to use radical people who have made claim P, but this usage of radical people is supposed to represent everyone who said claim P? I'll give an example below: 1. Suppose claim P is: 9/11 happened because of America's failed US foreign policy. 2. Jean Baudrillard has claimed a, b, and c to support P. Noam Chomsky has said d, e, and f to support P. (Note: Baudrillard and Chomsky are on the fringes of supporting P, meaning that they support P, but in very radical ways.) 3. However, a, b, c, d, e, and f are all false. 4. Therefore, P is false. Now, of course the fallacy is that one is only looking at two sources who argue for P, and by discounting those claims, there's a hasty generalization to say that P is false. So a hasty generalization, I believe is correct. However, my focus is on concentrating on the fringes. If one wants to argue against P, one doesn't argue against the fringes who argue for P. So it's sort of a straw-man, but at the same time, a, b, c, d, e, and f are true representations of Baudrillard and Chomsky. Specifically, is there a fallacy where one is discounting a claim where one only concentrates on the fringe groups that says P?
Richard Heck
October 15, 2010
(changed October 15, 2010)
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There was a nice post about this sort of argument on the Sojourner's blog recently: http://blog.sojo.net/2010/10/01/what-glenn-beck-and-alan-grayson-have-in-common/.
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