I was reading an argument for Metaphysical Solipsism and while most of the premises were ultimately meaningless, one of them store out to me and I still am unclear about its value.
This is a form of ontological parisomony which deems a competing theory a priori most likely if that theory has less ontological commitments than the other theory . If two theories X and Y have the same ontological commitments, but X is ontologically committed to Z and Y is not, it would deem Y as more parsimonious than X.
Thus, this argument is frameworked by the fact that metaphysical solipsism posits the fewest ontological assumptions. To promote an alternate ontology would be to assume that qualia represents a physical reality, external to the mind. It has been shown that such a fact is dubious and unjustifiable via the Trilemma, thus metaphysical solipsism ought to be deemed a priori most likely. ”Endquote
Is it true that Occam’s razor seems to support Solipsism, or does it reject solipsism on the grounds that it postulates equally as many types of entities and that realism has better explanatory power? I can’t find much information on the subject of Solipsism and Ockam’s Razor so I figured I’d ask here. Thanks in advance.
Read another response by Joe Rachiele
Read another response about Existence