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Education
Philosophy

What I remember from my philosophy courses is the spirited debate, lively dialogue. For me this site is too question-and-answer, like the Stanford Online Encyclopedia that is often pointed to in the responses. Is there a place on the web where I can find a more dialogue-based form of philosophy?

Sounds to me like you want something like a philosophical chat room. I don't know of any of these, but I would probably avoid them even if I did know of them. My experience with this is that too many people out there are too often to "discuss philosophy" when they haven't much of a clue as to what it is. But you don't have to share my prejudices!
Happiness

In a class on Aristotle we have been discussing the difference between the Greek's idea of Eudaimonia and what we today call happiness. Many of my classmates seem skeptical of more objective accounts like Aristotle's, instead defending subjective theories of happiness. Do you think this perhaps misguided view of happiness could be problematic? It seems to me that this view is embraced by a great number of my peers who, like me, come from comfortable middle class backgrounds. This "Do what you like as long as it makes you happy" attitude seems to result in both a sense of entitlement to whatever they happen to desire at the moment as well as a slavish need to act on any impulse. At the same time many of these people seem awfully depressed and unhappy for people with such privileged, comfortable lives. Do you think that this unique type of depression and a certain view of happiness are linked?

First, a clarification: as many scholars have noted, "happiness" is a misleading translation of the Greeek " eudaimonia ," and partly for the very reason that is at the heart of your question. The Greeks certainly had disputes over how precisely we should understand eudaimonia , but all would agree that it is the term to use in describing someone who has a good and enviable life (and by thuis, they did not mean good or enviable in a restricted moral sense, but in the very pragmatic sense that all of us would prefer, at least all other things equal). So eudaimonia will be the condition that is always, utterly, and flawlessly in our interest. Now, this makes what is wrong with a subjective conception of eudaimonia fairly obvious, but since you asked, I will quote myself (and my co-author, T. C. Brickhouse) here: "Giddy morons may suppose they pursue their interest by doing what only makes them giddier and more foolish, but sensible evaluation will conclude that such lives...
Education

Is the claim that education is a universal right a morally defensible claim? I have heard many people claim that education is a priviledge or a commodity, and they have quite convincing arguments. They say that because teachers need to be paid, and books, computers, etc. need to be purchased, that only those people who can afford it (or who can borrow the money for it) should have access to education. Although this conclusion is unsettling, I cannot seem to think of any reason to deny its validity, nor can I find a solid argument defending education as a right.

There is a saying among philosophers: "ought" implies "can." The application of this maxim to your question is as follows: It seems that anything that deserves to be called a "universal right" would be something that ought to be provided to everyone--no exceptions. But this could not possibly be true about education (or anything else, under the maxim) if the way the world is, as a matter of fact, makes it impossible, as a practical matter, actually to provide what such a "right" requires. So we might think about the question of whether or not there are people whom we simply can't provide with the resources necessary for the kind of education we might reasonably wish we could provide to everyone. Now, I think the question of whether or not we actually can educate everyone will depend on facts about sociology, psychology, and economics that I do not pretend to know. But I am inclined to think that the idea of educating absolutely everyone to the extent we might wish to educate them is...
Rationality

I just had a job interview today. As is often the case, I am now nervous as to whether or not I got the job. But in the process of being nervous, I got to (over)thinking about my own nervousness and potential disappointment if I don't get the job, and I've come to wonder something: would it be rational for me to be disappointing at not getting the job? I mean, I suppose if we were to endorse the logic that if (a) something is important to me, (b) it is rational to be disappointed when important things fail/fall through, and (c) getting this job is important to me, then it seems logical to be disappointed. But why endorse this logic in the first place? Why not just apply, do your best and then, if it falls through, shrug and move on to other opportunities? Is it in any meaningful way rational to be disappointed, sad or frustrated when things don't go our way? It may be natural, and it may be human, but that doesn't mean it has to actually make sense.

Great question, and one with very deep historical roots. The ancient Stoics, for example, thought that remorse and regret were not compatible with being a true Sage, and I think the same arguments they give about these responses would also apply to those of disappointment or frustration when things don't go as you had hoped they would. But to extend this way of thinking even further, you might then go on to ask whether it is even ever really rational to hope for something that is not under your own control. For the Stoics, the only thing that is under our control (or, at least, can and should be under our control) is how we react to things. As a result, such "bad" reactions as remorse, regret, disappointment, or frustration are not the right way to respond to things that happen in the world. The true Sage would understand how the world works so well that nothing he or she would ever do would give rise to remorse or regret. Similarly, the Sage would understand the world so well that nothing would...
Feminism

Is there such thing as a male feminist philosopher?

I think it depends on what precisely you mean by "feminist," but by most understandings of this term, I think there are a number of male feminist philosophers, and certainly an even greater number of male philosophers who are generally very sympathetic to and agree with feminist philosophy, even if they do not count feminist philosophy as one of their research specialties. From an armchair sociological perspective, I'm inclined to think that actually most male philosophers agree with much of feminism--including some who are nonetheless still capable of very un-feminist behaviors at times. Alas, it is one thing to recognize the value of a certain philosophical point of view, and quite another to live up to the demands of that point of view!
Ethics

Imagine some activity in which all affected parties have given their free and informed consent to the activity. Is this activity now ethically neutral/permitted, no matter what it is, insofar as it only affects those who consented to it in the first place? Suppose a person joins a fraternity that advertises itself as being organized around (for instance) learning from older peers, sharing and helping one's fellow students, making friends and participating in extracurricular sports. After being initiated, though, the person finds that there is an informal tendency of older fraternity members to bully new initiates, to make constant unreasonable demands of them and ostracize them if they refuse, to take their things without returning them and to use the new initiates as a less experienced opposing team for easy victories in sports competitions. Does the person who joined the fraternity have any right to complain about how he is being treated? Or can he, since the behavior engaged in is all nominally...

It sounds to me as if the notion of "informed consent" is being stretched past reasonable limits in your case. If it is well-known among members of the fraternity that new initiates are bullied, etc., it does not seem to me as if consent can be informed adequately if this is not made known to the prospective initiates before they pledge. At most colleges and universities, moreover, there are clear rules about what is and is not appropriate in these affairs, and anything that goes outside these rules is clearly not made exempt of sanction simply because the initiate "gave consent." More broadly, society has a reasonable interest in ensuring that somethings don't happen to its citizens--even if those citizens were to give consent. Slavery is a good example. Maybe someone might actually think it was a great idea to become the chattel slave of another, and might give his or her consent to such an arrangement. Even so, the arrangement would still be illegal, and I think the same goes for whether...
Sex

On December 9, 2005, Nicholas D. Smith wrote a response that said in part: "For the ancient Greeks, prostitution was entirely socially acceptable... whereas free males were expected never to commit oral sex (on any sex partner, male or female)." From what text(s) do we know this? Is there some text in which it is explicitly forbidden? Or do we infer it from stories and plays?

The gounds for my claim are twofold. On the topic of committing oral sex on females, it is an inference based upon the practice being treated as shameful in Aristophanic comedy. (See the note on this in Jeffrey Henderson's The Maculate Muse on p. 185; though compare what Henderson has to say on p. 52--obviously, I draw a different inference from the evidence! See also Kenneth Dover's understanding, given in his Greek Homosexuality on p. 102.) As for oral sex on males, those who were eligible to become citizens in Athens could be denied this opportunity if evidence could be given that the candidate had ever allowed any part of his body to be sexually penetrated. For other evidence, see Dover, p. 99.
Language

What's in a name? Recently, Ron Artest, a member of the world famous NBA LA Lakers team changed his name, officially, to "Meta World Peace". Apparently the sports announcers have been rebuked by the league for calling him by his former name, what someone might consider a "real name" or legitimate name. So now, when he does something great, the announcers excitedly shout what some might consider a slogan rather than a name: "World Peace!" I suspect there are a tangled network of issues involved here, and I'd appreciate some untangling. One issue that occurs to me, for instance, is whether the league's insistence that the announcers call this player "World Peace" is genuinely motivated by a respect for his choice of name. If he had named himself something offensive (a name involving a curse, for instance), would they insist the same? Ethically, as a society, do we prioritize respecting his choice of name over our taboos involving language? Is this even the right way to think about this issue? Are there...

This is an interesting one. One rather tangential aspect of your question is the fact that the backetball player formerly known as Ron Artest (whom I have watched play numerous times) seems a very poor role model on the topic of peace (or peaceful demeanor)! Anyway, such sniping aside, the news is that he changed his name to Metta World Peace (not Meta)--go figure! OK, so what is the philosophical issue here? Well, it seems there is a question as to whether or not we have a right to be called by our legal names. This does not seem to me to be a matter of "respect" for his choice of name, but a matter of recognizing that the name is now legally Metta World Peace. But I don't see why announcers couldn't refer to him as "MWP" or "Peace" without implied disrespect. In the end, public figures such as Metta World Peace (by any name) should get used to the idea that they do not have complete control over what others say about them or what others call them. I think one should expect as...
Death

If humans are nothing more than the interaction of DNA and environmental stimuli does this give us any hope for life after death? this may sound paradoxical, but if I am composed merely of memories and perceptions brought on by the course of nature is it possible my perceptions could return acting on a different substrate- I.e my perceptions and memories live on through my ancestors or people who shared a similar life experience? If they remember me in their dreams is this in fact an aspect of myself that lives on? Can a spirit be contained in a mere cause-effect relationship? If someone in the future is placed in a similar dillema to myself, is this like an echo in time? would they not share some of my perceptions? If the thoughts were merely part of an evolving system and conciousness is all action-reaction would this be a form of "resonance", Simpy because of a shared experience? Are the memories dead people not evolving just as we are? For example Jesus Christ is remembered as both a saint and a...

There is an awful lot going on in your question, and some of it I do not feel qualified to respond to. In particular, I think a complete answer to your question would require a good deal of work from contemporary theories of the mind, as well as how these theories inform questions of personal identity. So what I am about to say is only a very partial response (and may be inadequate even at that!). To be frank, I think the whole idea of life after death is--at least in the various ways I generally hear it characterized--probably nonsense. To see this, let's begin with your experience of yourself--what it is like being you . Think about this for a minute to bring in into focus (as best as you can), and then try out a few of the popular afterlife options: (1) Now imagine being both you and also, say, a chicken . Peck, peck...cheep, cheep...nice beak! Nah--you have no idea what it would be like to be a chicken, and whatever that would be like, it most certainly can...
Ethics

Hi. Let's assume that there's no higher power that could establish objective norms of morality. Then let's think of a fictitious situation in which a certain individual could greatly benefit himself by killing several innocent civilians. Even though this potential murderer tends to comply with laws and widely accepted moral rules created within society, he's a hypocrite and thus is willing to make exceptions when it comes to striving for his own personal goals. Imagine that in this hypothetical scenario the same person committing a crime could know for sure that no one will ever catch him, he will never have to serve a prison sentence, and there will be no blame whatsoever to damage his reputation. Moreover, we make an assumption that this individual will not feel any remorse for this horrific act of violence. So, in this particular situation, taking into account the potential murderer's point of view, why shouldn't a crime be committed?

The question is quite complex, and so I will try to be careful about breaking down my answer into appropriate parts. (1) The question seems to presuppose that there can be no "objective norms of morality" unless these are established by "higher power." I really don't agree with this assumption. For one thing, there are good reasons for thinking that there are problems with thinking that "objective norms of morality" even could be established by "higher power." This is the so-called "Euthyphro problem" that derives from a puzzle originally given in Plato's Euthyphro . For the application of this problem in modern ethical theory (and why many have doubted the "divine command theory" of morality), see the article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on-line: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/#EutPro (2) At any rate, plenty of other bases have been proposed for howw there could be "objective norms of morality." In Aristotle, "morality" would derive from what are...

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