I am a physician taking care of a woman with bad asthma who requires admission to the hospital. She happens to be six months pregnant, which is clinically relevant because low oxygen levels in the blood will affect the fetus. I inform her that if she refuses treatment, her unborn child will suffer oxygen deprivation, and will likely be mentally retarded. She says that "God will take care of us, I'm going home."

The situation that you describes raises all sorts of interestingphilosophical questions,y, I’m not surewhich to address. I'll assume for the sake of this discussion that you’re not wondering whether yourpatient could possibly be right about God’s intentions. So, let’sassume that she’s wrong: God won’t take care of her and her fetus, andshe’s placing her future child at significant risk of harm that would permanently and seriously restrict his (let’s give him a gender for thesake of this discussion) future life opportunities. There are then twoquestions that you might have in mind. One: “Is she doing somethingthat is morally wrong?” Two: “What are my own moral obligations in thissituation?” The answer to neither question is straightforward. First question: The answer to the first question is complicated by two facts– (a) theindividual who would be harmed by your patient’s lack of treatment iscurrently a fetus, and (b) your patient is apparently ignorant of thefact that she really is putting her...

I have a daughter that is 14 years young. As a mother I understand that teenagers in her age grow up and they want to have fun, most of them with the guys. But still I can't let her go out. I think it's wrong. But my question is, Is that really wrong? Because I remember myself in her age... I also see the friends around her, they don't go out... well she's the only one. But she suffers because of me not letting her to have a boy-friend. Do you think I should let her? Because I'm really confused...

I agree completely with all of Nicholas Smith’s suggestions about parenting. I especially like his remarks about the importance of an "exit strategy." Our job as parents, after all, is to raise our children to be independent and responsible adults, but they can hardly acquire these skills if they are never able to make their own decisions and learn from their own, hopefully minor, mistakes. We do want our teenagers to feel comfortable coming to us for advice and insight, not worried that they will get harsh judgment or even punishment, because as Prof. Smith suggests, if they fear this response, they simply will not come to us at all. At the same time, though, the high rates of teenage pregnancy and of women and children living in poverty remind us of the decisions that many fourteen year old girls will make when given the opportunity. This fact might suggest to us that many fourteen year old girls are not yet ready to make wise decisions for themselves. In such circumstances, it is our...

If you were molested and raped by several of your family members, how would you go about telling someone so you or no one else gets hurt. I don't wanna get anyone else involved but I just want it to stop.

The problem that you face (how to keep yourself (and perhaps others) safe) is very serious and calls for a kind of knowledge (i.e., of the resources available to you in your community) that philosophers don't have by training. But certain constraints that you put on a solution to this problem (that no one get hurt, that no one else get involved) might rest on certain philosophical assumptions that I would like to challenge. If we were assaulted and raped by a stranger, most of us would feel no moral confusion about what we are entitled to do. In such a situation, what the stranger did is very wrong and we have a right to protect ourselves (and others) against this harm, even if the consequences of this protection (e.g., getting the police involved) would be harm to the rapist (in the form of a jail sentence). But in cases in which we are victims of abuse at the hands of members of our own family, it can seem very difficult to figure out what is the right thing to do. We feel that we have...

I married from back home because of certain cultural pressures. He seemed like an all around nice guy but when he got here he changed. He admitted that he had put on a show in order to convince me to bring him here and now he is trying to control me. He also always fights with me over money matters. At the moment we are separated but not divorced and I am contemplating whether or not I should divorce him. He does not leave me alone but constantly hurts me and thinks I am cheating on him. I also caught him trying to start affairs with women both abroad and local and I feel I cannot trust him. When he came here I liked him but now I feel little to nothing towards him and I think he wants to use me for some end (hence why he wants to get back). Also he frequently hints that it's good to use women for money and etc., and then dump them for other women... Although this may not be the right place to ask such a question but what do you philosophers think of the situation? I think it would be interesting...

Leave him. He's a creep. Let me explain. From your description of him, your husband seems to regard and treat you as a mere object for his own satisfaction, and his satisfaction consists largely in giving you pain. If this is accurate, then it seems to me that you are under no obligation to continue to tolerate his company.

Concerning our moral obligations to other people, what is the distinction between killing and letting die? For example, if I'm at the beach and there's a child playing in the water, I think I can safely say that everyone would agree that it would be wrong for me to go in to the water and drown the child. But say I see the child drowning, and there's no one else around, and I could easily jump in and save him without risking my own life, would it be wrong for me to stand there and do nothing as he drowns? I'm not so sure what one's moral obligation is in this case. Personally, I would feel awful about letting the child drown and would certainly try to save him, but maybe not everyone would, and I'm hesitant so say they've done something wrong by doing nothing. In other words I don't know if I would support a law punishing such behavior.

I would like to distinguish two questions: (1) In any given case, is the mere difference between killing and letting die morally significant? and (2) From the point of view of public policy, should we draw a distinction between killing and letting die? I am convinced by the arguments that James Rachels provides in "Active and Passive Euthanasia," New England Journal of Medicine 292 (1975) against the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die per se. Through an examination of different cases, Rachels argues persuasively that when you hold all other factors equal (consequences, motive of the agent, consent of the person whose life is at stake), the mere difference between killing and letting die is morally insignificant. We tend to believe that there is a significant difference between this act (killing) and omission (letting die), because in most cases, these other factors are not equal. Usually people who kill have malicious intent and create significant harm;...

It seems to me that all morality is based on the belief that death is a bad thing. If we believed that death was desirable - for whatever reason - most everything would break down. But isn't it true that views on death are culturally determined - at least to some extent? Any thoughts would be appreciated.

In Plato’s Phaedo , Socrates explains to his friends why, in the face of his imminent execution, he is in a good mood. His whole life, he reports, has been a preparation for death (64a-b): after he dies, his soul will be separated from his body, and he will finally be able to attain the only thing of genuine value– knowledge of the forms (65b-e, 66b-67b, 69a-b). If Socrates is right, Cebes rightly asks, why shouldn’t we all commit suicide? (61b) Because, Socrates rather lamely responds, we are the property of the gods, and they should decide when we die (62b-c). Without such a view about the property rights of the gods, Cebes’ question is difficult for a person like the Socrates of the Phaedo to answer. We might think that suicide would be wrong because in death we are unable to meet our responsibilities to others, but what sense can one make of these responsibilities, if they, too, would be better off dead? Despite what Socrates suggests about the extraordinary virtues of...

Let's say that a virus spread throughout the world and damaged the areas of the brain that are responsible for emotions. The entire population was affected and could no longer experience any emotional reactions, although their reason and intellectual ability was unimpaired. Would morality change if we no longer have any emotional reaction to cheaters, thiefs, inequity, or tragedy? Maybe it's difficult to answer such a hypothetical, but any opinions would be appreciated.

And it is not only non-cognitivists who would believe that it would make a moral difference if humans did not experience certain emotions. For example, suppose that I were a cognitivist hedonist, act Utilitarian. I believe that one ought always to perform the act that produces the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, and I believe that that moral principle is true independently of my or anyone else’s commitment to it. For me, it would make a great deal of difference what sorts of emotions human beings experienced in different circumstances, since the amount of pain or pleasure that anyone feels as a result of my actions will depend, at least in part, on their emotional attachments. Or suppose that I am a cognitivist virtue theorist of the following variety: I believe that I ought to live my life in such a way that I live a good and meaningful life, and I believe that a corresponding normative principle applies to everyone else. They too ought to live their lives in such a way...

Many people would say that it’s nearly always wrong not to act, whilst someone suffers an unnecessary death that could have easily been prevented. For example, simply watching a child wander onto a busy road, and not acting so as not to loose ones place in a queue at the post office. It’s difficult to see how this could be morally permissible. Many people would also say that they don’t feel any moral obligation to donate their spare money to charity. For example, the money that’s required for me to have the internet access I need to ask this question, could be used to pay for life saving medication which could spare many children in Africa from a needless death. On the one hand we’re morally obliged to help when we can, on the other it’s morally permissible not to help even though we can. Is there any way to make these seemingly conflicting beliefs compatible? Should we sell up and give the proceeds to the needy? Or should we admit to ourselves that we’re not prepared to live up to our own moral...

As you may know, the question that you raise has been raised in very similar terms by Peter Singer in "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972). Singer himself presents the moral challenge not merely to Utilitarians like himself, but to all of us, who he believes are deeply committed to the following moral principle: "If one can prevent something very bad from happening (like the death of an innocent child) without any significant moral sacrifice, then one is morally obligated to do so." (Singer himself believes that a much stronger moral principle is true, but he believes that all of us will concede the truth of this principle.) He argues that it is this moral principle that explains our sense that it is not merely a nice thing to save a child from drowning, but in fact is a moral obligation, even if it would be a slight inconvenience for us to do so. If true, such a moral principle entails that it would be wrong for us to refrain giving away money that we have good...

In ethics, philosophers spend much time trying to figure out what is moral and immoral. My question is, why should we necessarily be moral? Where does this obligation to be moral come from or why do we have this obligation?

I agree that on one understanding of the question “Why should I bemoral?” the question is unintelligible. But I think that when mostpeople ask the question, “Why should I be moral?” they are asking aquestion that is short-hand for more substantive questions, like “Whyshould I tell the truth?” “Why shouldn’t I cheat on this exam?” “Whyshould I refrain from stealing if I can get away with it?” “Why shouldI care about anyone other than myself?” Morality, it seems, requires meto restrain my pursuit of my own self-interest for the sake of theinterests of others, and I think that it completely reasonable to askwhy I should do that. (It’s interesting, I think, that few people feelcompelled to answer the question, “Why should I care about myself?”). Different answers have been offered to the question,“Why be moral?” Most common (and least plausible, to my mind) is theanswer, “Because the Gods want you to.” Least common (but mostplausible, to my mind) is the answer, “Because by taking seriously theinterests of...

Socrates said "It is better to suffer evil than to do it". I am trying to work out if a consequentialist could make good sense of this claim, if anyone can!

Socrates makes this remark in the Gorgias in a context in which he’s arguing against Polus’ conception of the good life– that is, the life that is good for the person who is living it. He is not arguing for the greater importance of moral value over prudential value (or what Sally calls individual well-being); he is arguing that a person who cares solely about his own individual well-being, as Polus does, should be concerned never to do injustice. This is not because he should worry about getting caught, or about the possibility of someone taking revenge on his unjust actions, but solely because being an unjust person, in itself, is a bad state to be in-- that is, bad for the person who is unjust. In fact, Socrates believes that being a virtuous person is of overriding prudential value. No other thing comes close to virtue in prudential value, and so, whenever one is faced with the choice between being virtuous and not being virtuous– no matter what benefits might result from one’s vicious actions-...

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