Why does it seem that everything that I read in philosophy always uses "she" or "her" instead of "his" or "he"?

To the questioner: My sense is that either you are reading a mis-representative sample of philosophical writing or you are exaggerating the use of 'she' and 'her' because you have internalized the normative use of 'he' and 'his' and so examples that resist that norm stand out and perhaps wrankle. When I was an undergraduate in the mid 1980s, there was pressure to resist that norm -- but I don't have a sense that this resistance was completely successful in either philosophical or most non-philosophical writing. Certainly I don't see widespread use of gender-neutral pronouns and Louise's suggestion still sounds ungrammatical to my ear. In my own writing, I simply try use a mixed balance of gendered personal pronouns.

Consider the following scenario: I am very good at doing analytic philosophy (though I am not a genius by any means), specially analytic metaphysics, but not limited to that field. I am well acquainted with the literature on the subject, I have an excellent grasp of the arguments and am pretty good at suggesting objections or proposing new arguments (or variations of old ones). Also, I have a pretty good command of the relevant technical material, that is, classical logic, modal logic, mereology and set theory, etc. Suppose I am capable of original and rigorous work. Suppose I profoundly dislike being taught in a university but have a fine time debating with (competent) professors, visiting lecturers and students (outside of the lectures), who, if asked, will acknowledge my philosophical ability. However, since I am not fond of the academy (as a student), I do not have any degrees. Suppose I am still young so I haven't published anything but I have plenty of ideas which, with a little work, might make...

I think that Allen gives some good practical advice and that Eric discusses well some important bureaucratic/administrative challenges that you would face even if the strategy that Allen lays out went swimmingly. My answer, however, builds on a point that Oliver made. First, I agree with Oliver that earning degrees in philosophy might be useful for reasons that your question does not address. Reflecting on--and growing from--one's experience as a student at various levels is extremely important for a successful academic career, and so your lack of that experience constitutes another significant challenge. This long process of education also serves to test your skills and passions (Are you really as good as philosophy as you think? Is your passion deep-seated and strong enough?) and to hone them -- I would think even a philosophical genius would grow significantly by working through high-quality degree programs. Second, I have a practical suggestion. You describe yourself as young but located in a...

Why is Philosophy research considered less respectable study than researches in the empirical sciences?

I can think of two reasons why you might have come across this attitude. The first is simply a form of parochialism: the members of a specific disciplinary community may well believe that their forms and subjects of inquiry are the best, the most important, the most interesting, etc. This is partly due to self-selection: why work so hard and for so long to gain the credentials necessary to become a member of a specialized community if you do not already value what that community does? There are undoubtedly other sociological factors in play too -- for example, gaining prestige within a community like this may require single-minded ambition that rewards narrow parochialism, retaining motivation to work hard to remain with such a community may require continuing to value that communities mode of inquiry, etc. (I also note that this sort of parochialism occurs within academic sub-communities, and so there are philosophical sub-communities who view their particular sub-field as more respectable than others...

I forgot to add: There is a long and extremely interesting account of why scientific inquiry has become so valued in our culture -- an important source the thought that empirical inquiry is more respectable than philosophical inquiry is a more general attitude that treats the fruits and methods of scientific inquiry as among the most respectable forms of inquiry full stop. So, for example, this attitude helps to explain the righteous indignation of many liberals (and, indeed, others) towards politicians who seemingly ignore the results of scientific inquiry. Likewise, according to one conventional theory the rise in the esteem of science is so important in our culture that it has "pushed out" or "subtracted away" important religious practices and attitudes and so has led to a change and diminution of religion. Scholars who work in the history of ideas may be best equipped to explain the rise in the esteem of science over the last centuries, but one philosopher who does very interesting work in this...

Do the panel members believe that a student should be "talented" or in some way unique in order to seriously consider a career in philosophy? Philosophy graduate programs seem insanely exclusive, nevermind the less-than-scintillating job prospects which await after graduation; professional schools are difficult in their own way too, of course, and yet sometimes I get the impression that, whereas a "mediocre" doctor or lawyer will almost certainly find work, a "mediocre" philosopher will almost certainly be homeless. Would you ever counsel an undergraduate NOT to pursue her interest in philosophy, despite an ardent passion for the stuff?

Graduate study is not the only way to nurture an ardent passion in philosophy, and so passionate undergraduates should consider a doctorate only if they understand the job market and can live with all that it (and the prior extended period of study) entails economically and personally. Other panelists can comment on the rationality of the admissions processes at their own Universities, but it strikes me that there may well be an oversupply of doctorates and so admissions may not be exclusive enough. (I worry, in particular, that there are too many total doctorate programs because some Universities wish to "upgrade" to doctoral status for reasons that have nothing to do with the intellectual welfare or career prospects of their prospective graduate students.) All that said, doctorates who can't find satisfactory academic employment need not end up homeless because they have skills that are prized within business, law, and other professional fields.

Is it much harder to be a philosopher now (that is, to make a contribution to the discipline) than it was 50 years ago? Is philosophy like science in that there can seem at times to be less and less left for us to "discover," over time?

I agree that it is more difficult to gain access to and to contribute to highly specialized and professionalized academic communities than to less specialized and less professionalized ones. Not all fields of philosophy are as highly technical as mathematical logic, but nearly all philosphical communities are highly professionalized and can be accessed only by those with strong professional credentials. That said, contributing to a highly professionalized academic community is by no means the only way to engage philospohical issues in a profound manner: the classical philosophical texts and problems are just as amenable (or not) to human thought as they have been, and it is no harder for anyone to think philosophically about them now than it has been in the past.